Modelling pairwise and coalitional contests with reinforcement learning

Abstract

Game theory in biology started as an attempt to model animal contests by making assumptions about the fitness costs individuals pay in aggressive interactions. Among the different approaches, a notable one is to construct mechanistic models, using assumptions about behaviours and cognitive processes. Reinforcement learning is an important cognitive process, and we use it here to model pairwise and coalitional contests. We study situations where territorial neighbours become so-called dear enemies. A defending individual can get help from a neighbour through a defender-neighbour coalition against a challenger attempting territory takeover. In our model, coalition members have an advantage in contests in terms of costs of aggression, with the challenger being exposed to aggression from both members and each member only receiving part of the aggression from the challenger. We find that notable costs of border conflicts between neighbours, together with substantial advantages for coalitions, favour intervention. Neighbours intervene when they can help weaker defenders, in this way avoiding costs of border renegotiation with a new and potentially stronger territory owner. We also introduce different forms of perceived costs into the model, which we show correspond to the range from pure mutual assessment to partial self-assessment.