The self as a generative, teleological, and subjective prior: Mutually-modulated temporal agency

Abstract

How can we certify our existence? Recent theoretical studies have suggested that, in the brain, the effect inversely infers the possibility of the existence of the self as the cause. While this Bayesian view of the sense of agency is widely accepted, empirical evidence in support of this theory is still lacking. The current study examined outcome-modulated agency in terms of time perception in seven experiments, with a total of 90 participants. It was hypothesized that perceptual generation, not termination, should subjectively infer the existence of the self, even though both include the same stimuli and are driven by the same teleological action. Results suggest support for the hypothesis (Experiments 1 and 2). Participants judged stronger self-agency, detected less delay, or felt shorter duration for auditory generation, compared with termination, which was driven by the same volitional key-press. Furthermore, the main experiment, Experiment 3, focused on temporal probability distributions both for action and outcome (e.g., standard deviations or relative entropy), and concluded that the observed contrast in onset/offset agency indicates a mutual or bidirectional relationship between cause and effect only during agentive action, characterized by active (i.e., teleological) generation. Finally, the concurrent theoretical models for volitional action-modulated time perception are discussed on the basis of the suggested triplet (generativity, teleology, and subjectivity) dimensions of agency.\n\nExtended abstractThe sense of agency refers to the subjective experience of generating ones own actions (Gallagher, 2000). Within the past decade, research on this subject has increased, as increased understanding of human agency could be a window into knowing how we are aware of ourselves, and possibly allowing for a better understanding of mental illnesses, like schizophrenia. However, \"free will,\" \"self-consciousness,\" and/or \"volition\" are concepts that are always difficult to empirically investigate (Frith & Haggard, 2018). Researchers do not know exactly what occurs in our sensorium during \"agentive action.\" However, three conceptions could represent genuine dimensions of agency: generativity, teleology, and subjectivity (Haggard, 2019).\n\nRecent theoretical studies have suggested that, in the brain, the effect inversely infers the possibility of the existence of the self as the cause. This Bayesian view of the sense of agency may provide an explanation for classical statements, such as \"ego cogito, ergo sum (I think, therefore I am),\" \"cogito cogito, ergo cogito sum (I think that I think, therefore I think that I am),\" \"I move, therefore I am,\" or \"I predict, therefore I am.\" (e.g., Corlett, 2017). All of these theoretical claims implicitly refer to the Bayesian \"inverse\" probability or inference (e.g., \"thought as action\"), where the effect (perception) retrospectively postdicts the cause (action), as well as the action predicting the following perception (Figure 1, including generativity, teleology, and subjectivity as triplet dimensions of agency). This bidirectional temporal relationship between action and perception can be empirically examined in terms of the \"certification of the self\" or self as prior.\n\nO_FIG O_LINKSMALLFIG WIDTH=200 HEIGHT=126 SRC=\"FIGDIR/small/519934_fig1.gif\" ALT=\"Figure 1\">\nView larger version (23K):\norg.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@e2d70dorg.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@94b9d0org.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@330b16org.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@11d00a4_HPS_FORMAT_FIGEXP M_FIG O_FLOATNOFigure 1.C_FLOATNO The theoretical hypothesis of cross-dependency between action and sensation in time.\n\nNote: Bayesian subjective probability ignores the order between cause and effect (i.e., the physical temporal arrow), even if we make a distinction between the two (prediction vs. postdiction). Furthermore, the posterior distributions (as a result of dissolving the pre/postdiction error) for action-timing and sensation-timing are mutually-tugged since both share the same prior (i.e., the self must be the immediate active generator, as the current study suggests). Icon made by Freepik from www.flaticon.com.\n\nC_FIG\n\nO_FIG O_LINKSMALLFIG WIDTH=200 HEIGHT=148 SRC=\"FIGDIR/small/519934_ufig1.gif\" ALT=\"Figure 1\">\nView larger version (32K):\norg.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@1151ce4org.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@11bc371org.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@1bc6393org.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@12d48c8_HPS_FORMAT_FIGEXP M_FIG C_FIG\n\nThe current study examined effect-modulated agency in terms of time perception in seven experiments, conducted with a total of 90 participants. We hypothesized that perceptual generation, not termination, should inversely infer the self in action, even though both include the same stimuli, and are driven by the same action. Results support this hypothesis (Experiments 1 and 2). Participants judged stronger self-agency, detected less delay, or felt shorter duration for auditory generation, compared to termination, in instances driven by a key-press of his/her own volition, but may have also had different \"priors\" (i.e., self or other, as a categorical causal structure selection or model weighting). Furthermore, the main experiment, Experiment 3, focused on probability distributions both for action and outcome on the same temporal axis (e.g., standard deviations or relative entropy), and concluded that this contrast in onset/offset agency indicates the mutual or bidirectional relationship between cause and effect only during agentive action, characterized by the active generation (Figure 2). In summary, results indicate that the self is learned as a prior to being an independent agent that can immediately cause actions to occur within the environment merely through ones own volition. This interpretation is highly congruent with the literal meaning of the sense of agency and also with the theory of the triplet dimensions of agency.\n\nO_FIG O_LINKSMALLFIG WIDTH=200 HEIGHT=129 SRC=\"FIGDIR/small/519934_fig2.gif\" ALT=\"Figure 2\">\nView larger version (30K):\norg.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@57f98org.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@fbf3f7org.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@14e0bcborg.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@e86727_HPS_FORMAT_FIGEXP M_FIG O_FLOATNOFigure 2.C_FLOATNO Summarized results across Experiments 1(A,B,C) and 2(A,B,C).\n\nNote: Asterisks represent the significant differences only between onset and offset conditions. Dashed arches represent the main effect of on/offset condition. Error bars represents {+/-} 1 SE. ** p < .01, * p < .05, {dagger} p < .10, see Table S2 for full ANOVA results.\n\nC_FIG\n\nO_FIG O_LINKSMALLFIG WIDTH=200 HEIGHT=141 SRC=\"FIGDIR/small/519934_ufig2.gif\" ALT=\"Figure 2\">\nView larger version (32K):\norg.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@1cc466corg.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@2375feorg.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@17a4edorg.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@4ceba8_HPS_FORMAT_FIGEXP M_FIG C_FIG\n\nO_TBL View this table:\norg.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@39d38org.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@146d3d9org.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@fe5678org.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@1df0ffaorg.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@19205d1_HPS_FORMAT_FIGEXP M_TBL O_FLOATNOTable S2.C_FLOATNO O_TABLECAPTIONThe means and SDs of reports in each condition in Experiment 3.\n\nC_TABLECAPTION C_TBL We believe that the current study successfully observed the previously invisible relationship between action and perception in favor of advanced analysis, based on information theory, computational neuroscience (Figure 3), and theoretical discussions.\n\nO_FIG O_LINKSMALLFIG WIDTH=200 HEIGHT=110 SRC=\"FIGDIR/small/519934_fig3.gif\" ALT=\"Figure 3\">\nView larger version (20K):\norg.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@1bc1dc5org.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@146975borg.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@17aed8forg.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@1825b88_HPS_FORMAT_FIGEXP M_FIG O_FLOATNOFigure 3.C_FLOATNO The motor, tone, and intentional binding effect in Experiment 3.\n\nNote: Dashed arches represent the main effects of factors. Error bars represents {+/-} 1 SE. ** p < .01, * p < .05, {dagger} p < .10, see Table S2 for full ANOVA results.\n\nC_FIG\n\nThis manuscript has not been published or presented elsewhere in part or in entirety. There are no conflicts of interest to declare.\n\n\n\nO_FIG O_LINKSMALLFIG WIDTH=200 HEIGHT=147 SRC=\"FIGDIR/small/519934_ufig3.gif\" ALT=\"Figure 3\">\nView larger version (34K):\norg.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@1477b04org.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@1dd4b72org.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@18438aforg.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@1a57f7a_HPS_FORMAT_FIGEXP M_FIG C_FIG ReferencesO_BIBINTEXTCorlettP. PredictI, Therefore I Am: Perturbed Predictive Coding Under Ketamine and in Schizophrenia. O_TITLEBiological PsychiatryC_TITLE, O_VOLUMENR81C_VOLUMENR, O_FIRSTPAGE465C_FIRSTPAGE-466 (O_DATE2017C_DATE).C_BIBINTEXT\n\nO_BIBINTEXTFrithC. D., HaggardP. Volition and the Brain - Revisiting a Classic Experimental Study. O_TITLETrends NeurosciC_TITLE. 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