Individual Decision-Making Underlying the Tragedy of the Commons

Abstract

Group decision-making is common in everyday life, whether a family is sharing a meal or a corporation is dividing profits. Research in economics on group decision-making has coalesced into a theory known as the tragedy of the commons, which states that resources are inevitably overused when shared by a group. However, even while multiple approaches to mitigating overuse of common resources have been put forward, notable counterexamples to the tragedy of the commons exist such that groups are ultimately able to avoid resource overuse. Development of a computerized paradigm amenable to behavioral modeling and simulation analyses could allow for exploration of whether resources will be overused in a given group of individuals and allow for the rapid testing of behavioral interventions designed to reduce instances of resource overuse. Using a newly developed group decision-making task, we studied how participants made decisions to utilize shared resources for the potential to receive a larger amount of money or conserve resources for a smaller amount of money. Using behavioral modeling, we found that valuation of resource overuse is most impacted only when an exceptionally small amount of resources are remaining. Using computational analyses, we were able to differentiate individual participants by both group earnings and self-reported social attitudes in ways that correlated with their willingness to utilize resources. These results signify the importance of individual differences in group composition regarding the tragedy of the commons, emphasizing the impact of the attitudes and behaviors of individual group members in predicting shared resource use.