Branching and extinction in evolutionary public goods games

Abstract

Public goods games (PGGs) describe situations in which individuals contribute to a good at a private cost, but others can free-ride by receiving their share of the public benefit at no cost. PGGs can be nonlinear, as often observed in nature, whereby either benefit, cost, or both are nonlinear functions of the available public good (PG): at low levels of PG there can be synergy whereas at high levels, the added benefit of additional PG diminishes. PGGs can be local such that the benefits and costs are relevant only in a local neighborhood or subset of the larger population in which producers (cooperators) and free-riders (defectors) co-evolve. Cooperation and defection can be seen as two extremes of a continuous spectrum of traits. The level of public good production, and similarly, the neighborhood size can vary across individuals. To better understand how distinct strategies in the nonlinear public goods game emerge and persist, we study the adaptive dynamics of production rate and neighborhood size. We explain how an initially monomorphic population, in which individuals have the same trait values, could evolve into a dimorphic population by evolutionary branching, in which we see distinct cooperators and defectors emerge, respectively characterized by high production and low neighborhood sizes, and low production and high neighborhood sizes. We find that population size plays a crucial role in determining the final state of the population, as smaller populations may not branch, or may observe extinction of a subpopulation after branching. Our work elucidates the evolutionary origins of cooperation and defection in nonlinear local public goods games, and highlights the importance of small population size effects on the process and outcome of evolutionary branching.