Embodied Cognition and Decision-Making in the Primate Superior Colliculus

Abstract

A popular model of decision-making suggests that in primates, including humans, decisions evolve within forebrain structures responsible for preparing voluntary actions; a concert referred to as embodied cognition. Embodied cognition posits that in decision tasks, neuronal activity generally associated with preparing an action, actually reflects the accumulation of evidence for a particular decision. Testing the embodied cognition model causally is challenging because dissociating the evolution of a decision from preparing a motor act is difficult, if the same neuronal activity instantiates both processes. Ideally, one would show that manipulation of neuronal activity thought to be involved in movement preparation actually alters decisions, and not movement preparation. Here, trained monkeys performed a two-choice perceptual decision-making task in which they judged the orientation of a dynamic Glass pattern before and after unilateral, reversible inactivation of a brainstem area involved in preparing eye movements, the superior colliculus (SC). Surprisingly, we found that unilateral SC inactivation produced significant decision biases and changes in reaction times consistent with a role for the SC in evidence accumulation. Fitting signal detection theory and sequential sampling models (drift-diffusion and urgency-gating) to the data revealed that SC inactivation produced a decrease in the relative evidence for contralateral decisions. Control experiments showed that SC inactivation did not result in eye movement biases ruling out interpretations based on motor preparation or spatial attentional impairment. The results provide causal evidence for an embodied cognition model of perceptual decision-making and provide compelling evidence that the SC of primates plays a causal role in how evidence is accumulated for perceptual decisions, a process that is usually attributed to the cerebral cortex.