Integrated information structure collapses with anesthetic loss of conscious arousal in Drosophila melanogaster

Abstract

The physical basis of consciousness remains one of the most elusive concepts in current science. One influential conjecture is that consciousness is to do with some form of causality, measurable through information. The integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) proposes that conscious experience, filled with rich and specific content, corresponds directly to a hierarchically organised, irreducible pattern of causal interactions; i.e. an integrated informational structure among elements of a system. Here, we tested this conjecture in a simple biological system (fruit flies), estimating the information structure of the system during wakefulness and general anesthesia. Consistent with this conjecture, we found that integrated interactions among populations of neurons during wakefulness collapsed to isolated clusters of interactions during anesthesia. We used classification analysis to quantify the accuracy of discrimination between wakeful and anesthetised states, and found that informational structures inferred conscious states with greater accuracy than a scalar summary of the structure, a measure which is generally championed as the main measure of IIT. In stark contrast to a view which assumes feedforward architecture for insect brains, especially fly visual systems, we found rich information structures, which cannot arise from purely feedforward systems, occurred across the fly brain. Further, these information structures collapsed uniformly across the brain during anesthesia. Our results speak to the potential utility of the novel concept of an "informational structure" as a measure for level of consciousness, above and beyond simple scalar values. Author summaryThe physical basis of consciousness remains elusive. Efforts to measure consciousness have generally been restricted to simple, scalar quantities which summarise the complexity of a system, inspired by integrated information theory, which links a multi-dimensional, informational structure to the contents of experience in a system. Due to the complexity of the definition of the structure, assessment of its utility as a measure of conscious arousal in a system has largely been ignored. In this manuscript we evaluate the utility of such an information structure in measuring the level of arousal in the fruit fly. Our results indicate that this structure can be more informative about the level of arousal in a system than even the single-value summary proposed by the theory itself. These results may push consciousness research towards the notion of multi-dimensional informational structures, instead of traditional scalar summaries.