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Zylberberg, A.

Publications and source records attributed to Zylberberg, A..

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Value-based decisions involve sequential sampling from memory

Deciding between two equally appealing options can take considerable time. This observation has puzzled economists and philosophers, because more deliberation only delays the reward. Here we show that this seemingly irrational behavior is explained by the constructive use of memory. Using functional brain imaging in humans, we show that how long it takes to decide between two familiar food items is related to activity in the hippocampus, within specific regions shown to be associated with the retrieval of long-term memories. Moreover, we show that value is partially constructed during deliberation to resolve preference, and this constructive process changes behavior and brain responses. These results render memory as a supplier of evidence in value-based decisions, resolving a central paradox of choice.

animal behavior and cognition

Counterfactual reasoning underlies the learning of priors in decision making

Accurate decisions require knowledge of prior probabilities (e.g., prevalence or base rate) but it is unclear how prior probability is learned in the absence of a teacher. We hypothesized that humans could learn base rates from experience making decisions, even without feedback. Participants made difficult decisions about the direction of dynamic random dot motion. For each block of 15-42 trials, the base rate favored left or right by a different amount. Participants were not informed of the base rate, yet they gradually biased their choices and thereby increased accuracy and confidence in their decisions. They achieved this by updating knowledge of base rate after each decision, using a counterfactual representation of confidence that simulates a neutral prior. The strategy is consistent with Bayesian updating of belief and suggests that humans represent both true confidence, that incorporates the evolving belief of the prior, and counterfactual confidence that discounts the prior.

neuroscience

Cause for pause before leaping to conclusions about stepping

Many neurons in parietal and prefrontal association cortex undergo gradual changes in firing rate during the formation of some perceptual decisions. These dynamics are often ramp-like increases or decreases depending on the sign and strength of the sensory evidence and are thus hypothesized to represent the accumulation of noisy samples of evidence, analogous to biased diffusion. This idea was challenged recently. An analysis of sequences of action potentials recorded from neurons in the lateral intraparietal cortex (area LIP) suggests that the spikes on single trials are explained by rates that undergo a discrete step from an intermediate rate to either a low or high rate at a random time during deliberation. The average of such steps, like the average of biased diffusion, is consistent with the ramp-like firing rates observed in LIP, but a Bayesian model comparison deemed stepping superior. Here we show that a shortcoming in the mathematical depiction of drift-diffusion led to a severe bias in the model comparison. We conclude that at present there is no compelling evidence that favors the stepping account.

neuroscience