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Woodford, M.

Publications and source records attributed to Woodford, M..

10 recordsLinked to original sources

Imprecise counting of observations in averaging tasks predicts primacy and recency effects

Primacy and recency effects -- wherein early and recent observations exert disproportionate influence on judgments -- have long been noted in cognitive tasks involving the sequential presentation of information. In studies where human subjects make decisions based on the average of a sequence of numbers, recency effects are typically modeled phenomenologically through exponential discounting, while primacy effects are neglected altogether. Here, we exhibit the prevalence of both effects in such tasks, and propose that they result from the observers imprecision in their running tally of how many pieces of information they have received. If their approximate counting follows a central tendency -- a typical Bayesian pattern -- then past information is overweighted near the beginning of the sequence, while new numbers are overweighted towards the end of the sequence. Thus both primacy and recency effects are simultaneously predicted by this single mechanism. The model moreover nests exponential discounting as a special case in which the observer has no information about the count. The behavioral data suggests that subjects indeed misestimate the count of observations, with biases similar to those observed in numerosity-estimation tasks. Finally, we present evidence that the central tendency of subjects shifts towards lower counts in tasks with shorter sequence lengths, consistent with a Bayesian estimation of the counts. These findings provide new insights into the cognitive processes underlying serial-position effects in averaging tasks, with broader implications for other cognitive domains.

animal behavior and cognition↗

Endogenous Precision of the Number Sense

The behavioral variability in psychophysical experiments and the stochasticity of sensory neurons have revealed the inherent imprecision in the brains representations of environmental variables1-6. Numerosity studies yield similar results, pointing to an imprecise number sense in the brain7-13. If the imprecision in representations reflects an optimal allocation of limited cognitive resources, as suggested by efficient-coding models14-26, then it should depend on the context in which representations are elicited25,27. Through an estimation task and a discrimination task, both involving numerosities, we show that the scale of subjects imprecision increases, but sublinearly, with the width of the prior distribution from which numbers are sampled. This sublinear relation is notably different in the two tasks. The double dependence of the imprecision -- both on the prior and on the task -- is consistent with the optimization of a tradeoff between the expected reward, different for each task, and a resource cost of the encoding neurons activity. Comparing the two tasks allows us to clarify the form of the resource constraint. Our results suggest that perceptual noise is endogenously determined, and that the precision of percepts varies both with the context in which they are elicited, and with the observers objective.

animal behavior and cognition↗

Efficient numerosity estimation under limited time

The ability to rapidly estimate non-symbolic numerical quantities is a well-conserved sense across species with clear evolutionary advantages. Despite its importance, the rapid representation and estimation of numerosity is surprisingly imprecise and biased. However, a formal explanation for this seemingly irrational behavior remains unclear. We develop a unified normative theory of numerosity estimation that parsimoniously incorporates in a single framework information processing constraints alongside Brownian diffusion noise to capture the effects of time exposure of sensory estimations, logarithmic encoding of numerosity representations, and optimal inference via Bayesian decoding. We show that for a given allowable biological capacity constraint our model naturally endogenizes time perception during noisy efficient encoding to predict the complete posterior distribution of numerosity estimates. This model accurately predicts many features of human numerosity estimation as a function of temporal exposure, indicating that humans can rapidly and efficiently sample numerosity information over time. Additionally, we demonstrate how our model fundamentally differs from a thermodynamically-inspired formalization of bounded rationality, where information processing is modeled as acting to shift away from default states. The mechanism we propose is the likely origin of a variety of numerical cognition patterns observed in humans and other animals. Author summaryHumans have the ability to estimate the number of elements in a set without counting. We share this ability with other species, suggesting that it is evolutionarily relevant. However, despite its relevance, this sense is variable and biased. What is the origin of these imprecisions? We take the view that they are the result of an optimal use of limited neural resources. Because of these limitations, stimuli are encoded with noise. The observer then optimally decodes these noisy representations, taking into account its knowledge of the distribution of stimuli. We build on this view and incorporate stimulus presentation time (or contrast) directly into the encoding process using Brownian motion. This model can parsimoniously predict key characteristics of our perception and outperforms quantitatively and qualitatively a popular modeling approach that considers resource limitations at the stage of the response rather than the encoding.

animal behavior and cognition↗

Jointly efficient encoding and decoding in neural populations

The efficient coding approach proposes that neural systems represent as much sensory information as biological constraints allow. It aims at formalizing encoding as a constrained optimal process. A different approach, that aims at formalizing decoding, proposes that neural systems instantiate a generative model of the sensory world. Here, we put forth a normative framework that characterizes neural systems as jointly optimizing encoding and decoding. It takes the form of a variational autoencoder: sensory stimuli are encoded in the noisy activity of neurons to be interpreted by a flexible decoder; encoding must allow for an accurate stimulus reconstruction from neural activity. Jointly, neural activity is required to represent the statistics of latent features which are mapped by the decoder into distributions over sensory stimuli; decoding correspondingly optimizes the accuracy of the generative model. This framework yields in a family of encoding-decoding models, which result in equally accurate generative models, indexed by a measure of the stimulus-induced deviation of neural activity from the marginal distribution over neural activity. Each member of this family predicts a specific relation between properties of the sensory neurons--such as the arrangement of the tuning curve means (preferred stimuli) and widths (degrees of selectivity) in the population--as a function of the statistics of the sensory world. Our approach thus generalizes the efficient coding approach. Notably, here, the form of the constraint on the optimization derives from the requirement of an accurate generative model, while it is arbitrary in efficient coding models. Moreover, solutions do not require the knowledge of the stimulus distribution, but are learned on the basis of data samples; the constraint further acts as regularizer, allowing the model to generalize beyond the training data. Finally, we characterize the family of models we obtain through alternate measures of performance, such as the error in stimulus reconstruction. We find that a range of models admits comparable performance; in particular, a population of sensory neurons with broad tuning curves as observed experimentally yields both low reconstruction stimulus error and an accurate generative model that generalizes robustly to unseen data. Author summaryOur brain represents the sensory world in the activity of populations of neurons. Two theories have addressed the nature of these representations. The first theory--efficient coding--posits that neurons encode as much information as possible about sensory stimuli, subject to resource constraints such as limits on energy consumption. The second one--generative modeling--focuses on decoding, and is organized around the idea that neural activity plays the role of a latent variable from which sensory stimuli can be simulated. Our work subsumes the two approaches in a unifying framework based on the mathematics of variational autoencoders. Unlike in efficient coding, which assumes full knowledge of stimulus statistics, here representations are learned from examples, in a joint optimization of encoding and decoding. This new framework yields a range of optimal representations, corresponding to different models of neural selectivity and reconstruction performances, depending on the resource constraint. The form of the constraint is not arbitrary but derives from the optimization framework, and its strength tunes the ability of the model to generalize beyond the training example. Central to the approach, and to the nature of the representations it implies, is the interplay of encoding and decoding, itself central to brain processing.

neuroscience↗

Representational geometry explains puzzling error distributions in behavioral tasks

Measuring and interpreting errors in behavioral tasks is critical for understanding cognition. Conventional wisdom assumes that encoding/decoding errors for continuous variables in behavioral tasks should naturally have Gaussian distributions, so that deviations from normality in the empirical data indicate the presence of more complex sources of noise. This line of reasoning has been central for prior research on working memory. Here we re-assess this assumption, and find that even in ideal observer models with Gaussian encoding noise, the error distribution is generally non-Gaussian, contrary to the commonly held belief. Critically, we find that the shape of the error distribution is determined by the geometrical structure of the encoding manifold via a simple rule. In the case of a high-dimensional geometry, the error distributions naturally exhibit flat tails. Using this novel insight, we apply our theory to visual short-term memory tasks, and find that it can account for a large array of experimental data with only two free parameters. Our results call attention to the geometry of the representation as a critically important, yet underappreciated factor in determining the character of errors in human behavior.

neuroscience↗

Individual risk attitudes arise from noise in neurocognitive magnitude representations

Humans are generally risk averse: they prefer options with smaller certain outcomes over those with larger uncertain ones. This risk aversion is classically explained with a concave utility function, meaning that successive increases in monetary payoffs should increase subjective valuations by progressively smaller amounts. Here, we provide neural and behavioural evidence that risk aversion may also arise from a purely perceptual bias: The noisy logarithmic coding of numerical magnitudes can lead individuals to underestimate the size of larger monetary payoffs, leading to apparent risk aversion even when subjective valuation increases linearly with the estimated amount. A formal model of this process predicts that risk aversion should systematically increase when individuals represent numerical magnitudes more noisily. We confirmed this prediction by measuring both the mental and neural acuity of magnitude representations during a purely perceptual task and relating these measures to individual risk attitudes during separate financial decisions. Computational model fitting suggested that subjects based both types of choices on similar mental magnitude representations, with correlated precision across the separate perceptual and risky choices. Increased stimulus noise due to the presentation format of risky outcomes led to increased risk aversion, just as predicted by the model. The precision of the underlying neural magnitude representations was estimated with a numerical population receptive field model fitted to the fMRI data of the perceptual task. Subjects with more precise magnitude representations in parietal cortex indeed showed less variable behaviour and less risk-aversion in the separate financial choices. Our results highlight that individual patterns of economic behaviour may, at least partially, be determined by capacity limitations in perceptual processing rather than by processes that assign subjective values to monetary rewards.

neuroscience↗

Adaptive Efficient Coding: A Variational Auto-encoder Approach

We study a model of neural coding with the structure of a variational auto-encoder. The model posits that the encoding of individual stimulus values is optimally adjusted for a finite training sample of stimuli retained in memory. We demonstrate that this model can rationalize existing experimental evidence on both perceptual discrimination thresholds and neural tuning curve widths in multiple sensory domains. Finally, since our model implies that encoding is optimized for a sample from the environment, it also provides predictions about the adaptation of neural coding as the environmental frequency distribution changes.

neuroscience↗

Efficient coding of numbers explains decision bias and noise

Human subjects differentially weight different stimuli in averaging tasks, which has been interpreted as reflecting encoding bias. We examine the alternative hypothesis that stimuli are encoded with noise, then optimally decoded. Under a model of efficient coding, the amount of noise should vary across stimuli, and depend on statistics of the stimuli. We investigate these predictions through a task in which participants are asked to compare the averages of two series of numbers, each sampled from a prior distribution that varies across blocks of trials. Subjects encode numbers with a bias and a noise that both depend on the number. Infrequently occurring numbers are encoded with more noise. We show how an efficient-coding, Bayesian-decoding model accounts for these patterns, and best captures subjects behaviour. Finally, our results suggest that Wei and Stockers "law of human perception", which relates the bias and variability of sensory estimates, also applies to number cognition.

animal behavior and cognition↗

Efficient sampling and noisy decisions

The precision of human decisions is limited by both processing noise and basing decisions on finite information. But what determines the degree of such imprecision? Here we develop an efficient coding framework for higher-level cognitive processes, in which information is represented by a finite number of discrete samples. We characterize the sampling process that maximizes perceptual accuracy or fitness under the often-adopted assumption that full adaptation to an environmental distribution is possible, and show how the optimal process differs when detailed information about the current contextual distribution is costly. We tested this theory on a numerosity discrimination task, and found that humans efficiently adapt to contextual distributions, but in the way predicted by the model in which people must economize on environmental information. Thus, understanding decision behavior requires that we account for biological restrictions on information coding, challenging the often-adopted assumption of precise prior knowledge in higher-level decision systems.

neuroscience↗

Efficient coding of subjective value

Preference-based decisions are essential for survival, for instance when deciding what we should (not) eat. Despite their importance, choices based on preferences are surprisingly variable and can appear irrational in ways that have defied mechanistic explanations. Here we propose that subjective valuation results from an inference process that accounts for the information structure of values in the environment and that maximizes information in value representations in line with demands imposed by limited coding resources. A model of this inference process explains the variability in both subjective value reports and preference-based choices, and predicts a new preference illusion that we validate with empirical data. Interestingly, the same model also explains the level of confidence associated with these reports. Our results imply that preference-based decisions reflect information-maximizing transmission and statistically optimal decoding of subjective values by a limited-capacity system. These findings provide a unified account of how humans perceive and valuate the environment to optimally guide behavior.

neuroscience↗