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Weiss, P. H.

Publications and source records attributed to Weiss, P. H..

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Speeded Inference Game: Opening a new chapter in the assessment of error awareness

Influential theories on error processing assume that when we conduct errors adaptive processes are triggered to improve our behaviour and prevent errors in the future. These processes appear to be more effective after participants have detected an error. Therefore, the assessment of error awareness allowing a differential analysis of detected and undetected errors in the context of cognitive control and behavioural adjustments has gained more and more attention in the past decades. A common methodological challenge posed on all studies investigating error detection is that the number of undetected errors is usually relatively low. Here, we introduce a gamified experimental task that uses an adaptive algorithm to generate a robust and stable amount of errors with a high rate of undetected errors. Further, we were able to identify error types, which interestingly differed in terms of their detection rate. Moreover, the game-like appearance of the novel experimental task led to highly motivated participants. The results of the first study were replicated and extended by a second behavioural study. Notably, in study 2, a change in task design specifically modulated error detection, while these changes did not affect the total error rate. Potential applications of the open-source code will be discussed. With this newly developed paradigm, we wish to lay the ground for future research to understand better (neural) processes associated with error awareness.

neuroscience↗

Divergent effects of absolute evidence magnitude on decision accuracy and confidence in perceptual judgements

Whether people change their mind after making a perceptual judgement may depend on how confident they are in their decision. Recently, it was shown that, when making perceptual judgements about stimuli containing high levels of absolute evidence (i.e., the overall magnitude of sensory evidence across choice options), people make less accurate decisions and are also slower to change their mind and correct their mistakes. Here we report two studies that investigated whether high levels of absolute evidence also lead to increased decision confidence. We used a luminance judgment task in which participants decided which of two dynamic, flickering stimuli was brighter. After making a decision, participants rated their confidence. We manipulated relative evidence (i.e., the mean luminance difference between the two stimuli) and absolute evidence (i.e., the summed luminance of the two stimuli). In the first experiment, we found that higher absolute evidence was associated with decreased decision accuracy but increased decision confidence. In the second experiment, we additionally manipulated the degree of luminance variability to assess whether the observed effects were due to differences in perceived evidence variability. We replicated the results of the first experiment but did not find substantial effects of luminance variability on confidence ratings. Our findings support the view that decisions and confidence judgments are based on partly dissociable sources of information, and suggest that decisions initially made with higher confidence may be more resistant to subsequent changes of mind.

neuroscience↗

Neural correlates of metacognition across the adult lifespan

Metacognitive accuracy describes the degree of overlap between the subjective perception of ones decision accuracy (i.e., confidence) and objectively observed performance. With older age, the need for accurate metacognitive evaluation increases; however, error detection rates typically decrease. We investigated the effect of ageing on metacognitive accuracy using event-related potentials (ERPs) reflecting error detection and confidence: the error/correct negativity (Ne/c) and the error/correct positivity (Pe/c). Sixty-five healthy adults (20 to 76 years) completed a complex perceptual task and provided confidence ratings. We found that metacognitive accuracy declined with age beyond the expected decline in task performance, while the adaptive adjustment of behaviour was well preserved. Pe/c amplitudes varied by confidence rating, but they did not mirror the reduction in metacognitive accuracy. Ne/c amplitudes decreased with age except for high confidence correct responses. The results suggest that age-related difficulties in metacognitive evaluation could be related to an impaired integration of decision accuracy and confidence information processing. Ultimately, training the metacognitive evaluation of fundamental decisions in older adults might constitute a promising endeavour.

neuroscience↗