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Biology subjects

Ting, C.-C.

Publications and source records attributed to Ting, C.-C..

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Neural and computational underpinnings of biased confidence in human reinforcement learning

While navigating a fundamentally uncertain world, humans and animals constantly produce subjective confidence judgments, thereby evaluating the probability of their decisions, actions or statements being correct. Confidence typically correlates with neural activity positively in a ventromedial-prefrontal (VMPFC) network and negatively in a dorsolateral and dorsomedial prefrontal network. Here, combining fMRI with a reinforcement-learning paradigm, we leverage the fact that humans are more confident in their choices when seeking gains than avoiding losses to reveal a functional dissociation: whereas the dorsal prefrontal network correlates negatively with a condition-specific confidence signal, the VMPFC network positively encodes task-wide confidence signal incorporating the valence-induced bias. Challenging dominant neuro-computational models, we found that decision-related VMPFC activity better correlates with confidence than with option-values inferred from reinforcement-learning models. Altogether, these results identify the VMPFC as a key node in the neuro-computational architecture that builds global feeling-of-confidence signals from latent decision variables and contextual biases during reinforcement-learning.

animal behavior and cognition↗

Decreased confidence in loss-avoidance contexts is a primary meta-cognitive bias of human reinforcement learning

In simple instrumental-learning tasks, humans learn to seek gains and to avoid losses equally well. Yet, two effects of valence are observed. First, decisions in loss-contexts are slower, which is consistent with the Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT) hypothesis. Second, loss contexts decrease individuals confidence in their choices - a bias akin to a Pavlovian-to-metacognitive transfer (PMT). Whether these two effects are two manifestations of a single mechanism or whether they can be partially dissociated is unknown. Here, across six experiments, we attempted to disrupt the PIT effects by manipulating the mapping between decisions and actions and imposing constraints on response times (RTs). Our goal was to assess the presence of the metacognitive bias in the absence of the RT bias. Were observed both PIT and PMT despite our disruption attempts, establishing that the effects of valence on motor and metacognitive responses are very robust and replicable. Nonetheless, within- and between-individual inferences reveal that the confidence bias resists the disruption of the RT bias. Therefore, although concomitant in most cases, PMT and PIT seem to be - partly - dissociable. These results highlight new important mechanistic constraints that should be incorporated in learning models to jointly explain choice, reaction times and confidence.

animal behavior and cognition↗

Dynamic combination of sensory and reward information under time pressure

When making choices, collecting more information is beneficial but comes at the cost of sacrificing time that could be allocated to making other potentially rewarding decisions. To investigate how the brain balances these costs and benefits, we conducted a series of novel experiments in humans and simulated various computational models. Under six levels of time pressure, subjects made decisions either by integrating sensory information over time or by dynamically combining sensory and reward information over time. We found that during sensory integration, time pressure reduced performance as the deadline approached, and choice was more strongly influenced by the most recent sensory evidence. By fitting performance and reaction time with various models we found that our experimental results are more compatible with leaky integration of sensory information with an urgency signal or a decision process based on stochastic transitions between discrete states modulated by an urgency signal. When combining sensory and reward information, subjects spent less time on integration than optimally prescribed when reward decreased slowly over time, and the most recent evidence did not have the maximal influence on choice. The suboptimal pattern of reaction time was partially mitigated in an equivalent control experiment in which sensory integration over time was not required, indicating that the suboptimal response time was influenced by the perception of imperfect sensory integration. Meanwhile, during combination of sensory and reward information, performance did not drop as the deadline approached, and response time was not different between correct and incorrect trials. These results indicate a decision process different from what is involved in the integration of sensory information over time. Together, our results not only reveal limitations in sensory integration over time but also illustrate how these limitations influence dynamic combination of sensory and reward information.

neuroscience↗