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Peters, M. A. K.

Publications and source records attributed to Peters, M. A. K..

4 recordsLinked to original sources

Normal observers show no evidence for blindsight in facial emotion perception

It is commonly assumed that normal human observers can exhibit blindsight-like behavior: the ability to discriminate or identify a stimulus without being aware of it. However, we recently used a bias-free task to show that what looks like blindsight may in fact be an artifact of typical experimental paradigms susceptibility to response bias. While those findings challenge many previous reports of blindsight in normal observers, they do not rule out the possibility that different stimuli or techniques could reveal such perception without awareness. One particularly intriguing candidate for this unconscious perception is emotion processing, as processing of emotional stimuli (e.g. fearful/happy faces) has been reported to potentially bypass conscious visual circuits. Here we used the bias-free blindsight paradigm to investigate whether emotion processing might reveal featural blindsight, i.e. the ability to identify a faces emotion without having introspective access to the task-relevant features of the face that led to the discrimination decision. However, despite the purported ability of emotional stimuli to bypass conscious visual processing, we saw no evidence for such emotion processing featural blindsight: like in our previous study, as soon as participants could identify a faces emotion they reported introspective access to the task-relevant features, matching predictions of a Bayesian ideal observer. The present results challenge dominant theory, adding to the growing body of evidence that perceptual discrimination ability in the complete absence of introspective access may not be possible for neurologically intact observers.

neuroscience

Continuous flash suppression and monocular pattern masking impact subjective awareness similarly

Peters & Lau (2015) found that when criterion bias is controlled for, there is no evidence for unconscious visual perception in normal observers, in the sense that they cannot directly discriminate a target above chance without knowing it. One criticism of that study is that the visual suppression method used, forward and backward masking (FBM), may be too blunt in the way it interferes with visual processing to allow for unconscious forced-choice discrimination. To investigate this question we compared FBM directly to continuous flash suppression (CFS) in a two-interval forced choice task. Although CFS is popular, and may be thought of as a more powerful visual suppression technique, we found no difference in the degree of perceptual impairment between the two suppression types. To the extent that CFS impairs perception, both objective discrimination and subjective awareness are impaired to similar degrees under FBM. This pattern was consistently observed across 3 experiments in which various experimental parameters were varied. These findings provide evidence for an ongoing debate about unconscious perception: normal observers cannot perform forced-choice discrimination tasks unconsciously.

animal behavior and cognition

On a ‘failed’ attempt to manipulate conscious perception with transcranial magnetic stimulation to prefrontal cortex

It has been reported that continuous theta burst transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) impairs metacognitive awareness in visual perception (Rounis et al., 2010). Bor et al. (2017) recently attempted to replicate this result. However, the authors modified the experimental design of the original study considerably, meaning that this was not strictly a replication. In some cases, the changes are a priori expected to lower the chance of obtaining positive findings. Despite these changes, the researchers in fact still found an effect similar to Rounis et al.s, but they claimed that it was necessary to adopt certain criteria to discard {bsim}30% of their subjects, after which a null result was reported. Using computer simulations, we evaluated whether the subject exclusion criteria Bor et al. adopted was appropriate or beneficial. We found that, contrary to their intended purpose, excluding subjects by their criteria does not actually reduce false positive rates. Taking into account both their positive result (without subject exclusion) and negative result (after exclusion) in a Bayesian framework, we further found that their results suggest a 75% or greater likelihood that TMS to DLPFC does in fact impair metacognition, directly contradicting their claim of replication failure. That lesion and chemical inactivation studies are known to demonstrate positive effects in similar paradigms further suggests that Bor et al.s alleged negative finding cannot be taken as evidence against the role of the prefrontal cortex in conscious perception in general.

neuroscience

Superior Colliculus Neuronal Ensemble Activity Signals Optimal Rather Than Subjective Confidence

Recent studies suggest that neurons in sensorimotor circuits involved in perceptual decision-making also play a role in decision confidence. In these studies, confidence is often considered to be an optimal readout of the probability that a decision is correct. However, the information leading to decision accuracy and the report of confidence often co-varied, leaving open the possibility that there are actually two dissociable signal types in the brain: signals that correlate with decision accuracy (optimal confidence) and signals that correlate with subjects behavioral reports of confidence (subjective confidence). We recorded neuronal activity from a sensorimotor decision area, the superior colliculus (SC) of monkeys, while they performed two different tasks. In our first task, decision accuracy and confidence co-varied, as in previous studies. In our second task, we implemented a novel motion discrimination task with stimuli that were matched for decision accuracy but produced different levels of confidence as reflected by behavioral reports. We used a multivariate decoder to predict monkeys choices from neuronal population activity. As in previous studies on perceptual decision-making mechanisms, we found that neuronal decoding performance increased as decision accuracy increased. However, when decision accuracy was matched, performance of the decoder was similar between high and low subjective confidence conditions. These results show that the SC likely signals optimal decision confidence similar to previously reported cortical mechanisms, but is unlikely to play a critical role in subjective confidence. The results also motivate future investigations to determine where in the brain signals related to subjective confidence reside.\n\nSignificance StatementConfidence is thought to reflect the rational or optimal belief concerning ones choice accuracy. Here, we introduce a novel version of the dot-motion discrimination task with stimulus conditions that produce similar accuracy but different subjective behavioral reports of confidence. We decoded decision performance of this task from neuronal signals in the superior colliculus (SC), a subcortical region involved in decision-making. We found that SC activity signaled a perceptual decision for visual stimuli, with the strength of this activity reflecting decision accuracy, but not the subjective level of confidence as reflected by behavioral reports. These results demonstrate an important role for the SC in perceptual decision-making and challenge current ideas about how to measure subjective confidence in monkeys and humans.

neuroscience