Biology subjects

Murphy, S. T.

Publications and source records attributed to Murphy, S. T..

5 recordsLinked to original sources

bioRxiv2026

Developing a Standard Definition for Sequences of Concern

Readily available nucleic acid synthesis is both critical for the bioeconomy and an increasingly pressing security concern due to the potential for accidental or deliberate misuse. While biosecurity experts broadly agree that nucleic acid providers should screen orders for potential "sequences of concern," there has previously been no agreed standard for how to define and recognize such sequences. To address this gap, we first organized a test set of 1.1 million sequences from pathogens and toxins on the Australia Group Common Control Lists and their non-controlled relatives, along with model organisms and synthetic constructs. An initial categorization of sequences as to whether or not they were sequence of concern was produced by comparing the results of four biosecurity screening systems for each of these sequences, finding that these systems already agreed on the categorization of more than 80% of sequences. We then refined these results through a science-based stakeholder review process to define a rubric for determining whether a sequence should be flagged as a potential sequence of concern, then applied this rubric to improve the categorization of test sets. The result is a rubric that identifies sequences of concern with respect to human pandemic-potential viruses, key classes of low-risk genes, and controlled toxins. Applying this rubric to the test set collection has reduced the number of test sequences with disputed categorization by 44.3% for controlled viruses and 10.7% across the test set as a whole. Together, these results provide a concrete "sequence of concern" definition that can be used as a foundation for development of biosecurity screening standards and policy.

bioinformatics↗

bioRxiv2025

Inter-tool analysis of a NIST dataset for assessing baseline nucleic acid sequence screening

Nucleic acid synthesis is a dual-use technology that can benefit fields such as biology, medicine, and information storage. However, synthetic nucleic acids could also potentially be used negligently and ultimately cause harm, or be used with malicious intent to cause harm. Thus, this technology needs to be appropriately safeguarded. Sequence screening is one component of a biosecurity protocol for preventing such harm and consists of differentiating Sequences of Concern (SOCs) from benign sequences that are not associated with pathogenicity or toxicity. There exist many fit-for-purpose tools that have been developed for DNA synthesis sequence screening. However, questions remain regarding their performance with respect to consistency of screening. To aid in determining if screening tools are harmonized in regard to baseline sequence screening, NIST constructed a test dataset based on current screening recommendations. NIST then sent blinded datasets to sequence screening tool developers for testing. Overall, there was a general agreement between the tools and NIST assignments of the sequences and all tools had a baseline performance of greater than 95% sensitivity and 97% accuracy. Disagreement on specific sequences largely arose from single tools and could be traced to differences in defining a SOC and/or methodological differences in screening algorithms.

bioinformatics↗

bioRxiv2025

Defending Synthetic DNA Orders Against Splitting-Based Obfuscation

Biosecurity screening of synthetic DNA orders is a key defense against malicious actors and careless enthusiasts producing dangerous pathogens or toxins. It is important to evaluate biosecurity screening tools for potential vulnerabilities and to work responsibly with providers to ensure that vulnerabilities can be patched before being publicly disclosed. Here, we consider a class of potential vulnerabilities in which a DNA sequence is obfuscated by splitting it into two or more fragments that can be readily joined via routine biological mechanisms such as restriction enzyme digestion or splicing. We evaluated this potential vulnerability by developing a test set of obfuscated sequences based on controlled venoms, sharing these materials with the biosecurity screening community, and collecting test results from open source and commercial biosecurity screening tools, as well as a novel Gene Edit Distance algorithm specifically designed to be robust against splitting-based obfuscations.

bioinformatics↗

bioRxiv2024

Toward AI-Resilient Screening of Nucleic Acid Synthesis Orders: Process, Results, and Recommendations

Fast-moving advances in AI-assisted protein engineering are enabling breakthroughs in the life sciences that promise numerous beneficial applications. At the same time, these new capabilities are creating potential biosecurity challenges by providing new pathways to intentional or accidental synthesis of genes that encode hazardous proteins. The synthesis of nucleic acids is a key choke point in the AI-assisted protein engineering pipeline as it is where digital designs are transformed into physical instructions that can produce potentially harmful proteins. Thus, one focus for efforts to enhance biosecurity in the face of new AI-enabled capabilities is on bolstering the screening of orders by nucleic acid synthesis providers. We describe a multistakeholder, cross-sector effort to address biosecurity challenges with uses of AI-powered biological design tools to reformulate naturally occurring proteins of concern to create synthetic homologs that have low sequence identity to the wild-type proteins. We evaluated the abilities of traditional nucleic acid biosecurity screening tools to detect these synthetic homologs and found that, of tools tested, not all could previously detect such AI-redesigned sequences reliably. However, as we report, patches were built and deployed to improve detection rates over the course of the project, resulting in a final mean detection rate over tools of 97% of the synthetic homologs that were determined, using in-silico metrics, to be more likely to retain wild-type-like function. Finally, we make recommendations on approaches for studying and addressing the rising risk of adversarial AI-assisted protein engineering attacks like the one we identified and worked to mitigate.

synthetic biology↗

bioRxiv2018

Forecasting the global extent of invasion of the cereal pest Spodoptera frugiperda, the fall armyworm

Fall armyworm, Spodoptera frugiperda, is a crop pest native to the Americas, which has invaded and spread throughout sub-Saharan Africa within two years. Recent estimates of 20-50% maize yield loss in Africa suggest severe damage to livelihoods. Fall armyworm is still infilling its potential range in Africa, and could spread to other continents. In order to understand fall armyworms year-round, global, potential distribution, we used evidence of the effects of temperature and precipitation on fall armyworm life-history, combined with data on native and African distributions to construct Species Distribution Models (SDMs). Fall armyworm has only invaded areas that have a climate similar to the native distribution, validating the use of climatic SDMs. The strongest climatic limits on fall armyworms year-round distribution are the coldest annual temperature and the amount of rain in the wet season. Much of sub-Saharan Africa can host year-round fall armyworm populations, but the likelihoods of colonising North Africa and seasonal migrations into Europe are hard to predict. South and Southeast Asia and Australia have climate that would permit fall armyworm to invade. Current trade and transportation routes reveal Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand face high threat of fall armyworm invasions originating from Africa.

ecology↗