Biology subjects

Murawski, C.

Publications and source records attributed to Murawski, C..

4 recordsLinked to original sources

bioRxiv2018

Where the really hard choices are: A general framework to quantify decision difficulty

Life presents us with decisions of varying degrees of difficulty. Many of them are NP-hard, that is, they are computationally intractable. Two important questions arise: which properties of decisions drive extreme computational hardness and what are the effects of these properties on human-decision making? Here, we postulate that we can study the effects of computational complexity on human decision-making by studying the mathematical properties of individual instances of NP-hard problems. We draw on prior work in computational complexity theory, which suggests that computational difficulty can be characterized based on the features of instances of a problem. This study is the first to apply this approach to human decision-making. We measured hardness, first, based on typical-case complexity (TCC), a measure of average complexity of a random ensemble of instances, and, second, based on instance complexity (IC), a measure that captures the hardness of a single instance of a problem, regardless of the ensemble it came from. We tested the relation between these measures and (i) decision quality as well as (ii) time expended in a decision, using two variants of the 0-1 knapsack problem, a canonical and ubiquitous computational problem. We show that participants expended more time on instances with higher complexity but that decision quality was lower in those instances. These results suggest that computational complexity is an inherent property of the instances of a problem, which affect human and other kinds of computers.

animal behavior and cognition↗

bioRxiv2018

Hard decisions shape the neural coding of preferences

Hard decisions between equally valued alternatives can result in preference changes, meaning that subsequent valuations for chosen items increase and decrease for rejected items. Previous research suggests that this phenomenon is a consequence of cognitive dissonance reduction after the decision, induced by the mismatch between initial preferences and decision outcomes. In contrast, this functional magnetic resonance imaging and eye-tracking study tested whether preferences are already updated online while making decisions. Preference changes could be predicted from activity in left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and precuneus during decision-making. Furthermore, fixation durations predicted both choice outcomes and subsequent preference changes. These preference adjustments became behaviourally relevant at re-evaluation, but only for choices that were remembered and were associated with hippocampus activity. Our findings refute classical explanations of post-choice dissonance reduction and instead suggest that preferences evolve dynamically as decisions arise, potentially as a mechanism to prevent stalemate situations in underdetermined decision scenarios.

neuroscience↗

bioRxiv2017

Electrophysiological indices reflect switches between Bayesian and heuristic strategies in perceptual learning

Belief updating entails the incorporation of new information about the environment into internal models of the world. Bayesian inference is the statistically optimal strategy for performing belief updating in the presence of uncertainty. An important open question is whether the use of cognitive strategies that implement Bayesian inference is dependent upon motivational state and, if so, how this is reflected in electrophysiological signatures of belief updating in the brain. Here we recorded the electroencephalogram of participants performing a simple reward learning task with both monetary and non-monetary instructive feedback conditions. Our aim was to distinguish the influence of the rewarding properties of feedback on belief updating from the information content of the feedback itself. A Bayesian updating model allowed us to quantify different aspects of belief updating across trials, including the size of belief updates and the uncertainty of beliefs. Faster learning rates were observed in the monetary feedback condition compared to the instructive feedback condition, while belief updates were generally larger, and belief uncertainty smaller, with monetary compared to instructive feedback. Larger amplitudes in the monetary feedback condition were found for three event-related potential components: the P3a, the feedback-related negativity (FRN) and the late positive potential (LPP). These findings suggest that motivational state influences inference strategies in reward learning, and this is reflected in the electrophysiological correlates of belief updating.

neuroscience↗

bioRxiv2017

The neural encoding of information prediction errors during non-instrumental information seeking

In a dynamic world, accurate beliefs about the environment are vital for survival, and individuals should therefore regularly seek out new information with which to update their beliefs. This aspect of behaviour is not well captured by standard theories of decision making, and the neural mechanisms of information seeking remain unclear. One recent theory posits that valuation of information results from representation of informative stimuli within canonical neural reward-processing circuits, even if that information lacks instrumental use. We investigated this question by recording EEG from twenty-three human participants performing a non-instrumental information-seeking task. In this task, participants could pay a monetary cost to receive advance information about the likelihood of receiving reward in a lottery at the end of each trial. Behavioural results showed that participants were willing to incur considerable monetary costs to acquire early but non-instrumental information. Analysis of the event-related potential elicited by informative cues revealed that the feedback-related negativity independently encoded both an information prediction error and a reward prediction error. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that information seeking results from processing of information within neural reward circuits, and suggests that information may represent a distinct dimension of valuation in decision making under uncertainty.

neuroscience↗