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Mudrik, L.

Publications and source records attributed to Mudrik, L..

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Imaging Object-Scene Integration in Visible and Invisible Natural Scenes

Integrating objects with their context is a key step in the interpretation of complex visual scenes. Humans can do this very quickly, yet the brain mechanisms that mediate this ability are not yet understood. Here, we used functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to measure brain activity while participants viewed visual scenes depicting a person performing an action with an object that was either congruent or incongruent with the scene. Univariate and multivariate analyses revealed different activity for congruent compared to incongruent scenes in the lateral occipital complex, inferior temporal cortex, parahippocampal cortex, and prefrontal cortex, in line with existing models of scene processing. Importantly, and in contrast to previous studies, these activations could not be explained by task-induced conflicts. A secondary goal of this study was to examine whether object-context integration could occur in the absence of awareness, by comparing brain activity elicited by congruent vs. incongruent scenes that were suppressed from awareness using visual masking. We found no evidence for brain activity differentiating between congruent and incongruent invisible scenes. Overall, our results provide novel support for the roles of PHC and PFC in conscious object-context integration which cannot be explained by either low-level differences or task demands. Yet they further suggest that activity in these regions is decreased by visual masking to the point of becoming undetectable with our fMRI protocol.

neuroscience

Neural precursors of decisions that matter--an ERP study of deliberate and arbitrary choice

The readiness potential (RP)--a key ERP correlate of upcoming action--is known to precede subjects reports of their decision to move. Some view this as evidence against a causal role for consciousness in human decision-making and thus against free-will. Yet those studies focused on arbitrary decisions--purposeless, unreasoned, and without consequences. It remains unknown to what degree the RP generalizes to deliberate, more ecological decisions. We directly compared deliberate and arbitrary decision-making during a $1000-donation task to non-profit organizations. While we found the expected RPs for arbitrary decisions, they were strikingly absent for deliberate ones. Our results and drift-diffusion model are congruent with the RP representing accumulation of noisy, random fluctuations that drive arbitrary--but not deliberate--decisions. They further point to different neural mechanisms underlying deliberate and arbitrary decisions, challenging the generalizability of studies that argue for no causal role for consciousness in decision-making to real-life decisions.\n\nSignificance StatementThe extent of human free will has been debated for millennia. Previous studies demonstrated that neural precursors of action--especially the readiness potential--precede subjects reports of deciding to move. Some viewed this as evidence against free-will. However, these experiments focused on arbitrary decisions--e.g., randomly raising the left or right hand. We directly compared deliberate (actual $1000 donations to NPOs) and arbitrary decisions, and found readiness potentials before arbitrary decisions, but--critically--not before deliberate decisions. This supports the interpretation of readiness potentials as byproducts of accumulation of random fluctuations in arbitrary but not deliberate decisions and points to different neural mechanisms underlying deliberate and arbitrary choice. Hence, it challenges the generalizability of previous results from arbitrary to deliberate decisions.

neuroscience