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Momennejad, I.

Publications and source records attributed to Momennejad, I..

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Predicting the future with multi-scale successor representations

The successor representation (SR) is a candidate principle for generalization in reinforcement learning, computational accounts of memory, and the structure of neural representations in the hippocampus. Given a sequence of states, the SR learns a predictive representation for every given state that encodes how often, on average, each upcoming state is expected to be visited, even if it is multiple steps ahead. A discount or scale parameter determines how many steps into the future SR's generalizations reach, enabling rapid value computation, subgoal discovery, and flexible decision-making in large trees. However, SR with a single scale could discard information for predicting both the sequential order of and the distance between states, which are common problems in navigation for animals and artificial agents. Here we propose a solution: an ensemble of SRs with multiple scales. We show that the derivative of multi-scale SR can reconstruct both the sequence of expected future states and estimate distance to goal. This derivative can be computed linearly: we show that a multi-scale SR ensemble is the Laplace transform of future states, and the inverse of this Laplace transform is a biologically plausible linear estimation of the derivative. Multi-scale SR and its derivative could lead to a common principle for how the medial temporal lobe supports both map-based and vector-based navigation.

neuroscience

Offline Replay Supports Planning: fMRI Evidence from Reward Revaluation

Making decisions in sequentially structured tasks requires integrating distally acquired information. The extensive computational cost of such integration challenges planning methods that integrate online, at decision time. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether \"offline\" integration during replay supports planning, and if so which memories should be replayed. Inspired by machine learning, we propose that (a) offline replay of trajectories facilitates integrating representations that guide decisions, and (b) unsigned prediction errors (uncertainty) trigger such integrative replay. We designed a 2-step revaluation task for fMRI, whereby participants needed to integrate changes in rewards with past knowledge to optimally replan decisions. As predicted, we found that (a) multi-voxel pattern evidence for off-task replay predicts subsequent replanning; (b) neural sensitivity to uncertainty predicts subsequent replay and replanning; (c) off-task hippocampus and anterior cingulate activity increase when revaluation is required. These findings elucidate how the brain leverages offline mechanisms in planning and goal-directed behavior under uncertainty.

neuroscience

The successor representation in human reinforcement learning

Theories of reward learning in neuroscience have focused on two families of algorithms, thought to capture deliberative vs. habitual choice. \"Model-based\" algorithms compute the value of candidate actions from scratch, whereas \"model-free\" algorithms make choice more efficient but less flexible by storing pre-computed action values. We examine an intermediate algorithmic family, the successor representation (SR), which balances flexibility and efficiency by storing partially computed action values: predictions about future events. These pre-computation strategies differ in how they update their choices following changes in a task. SRs reliance on stored predictions about future states predicts a unique signature of insensitivity to changes in the tasks sequence of events, but flexible adjustment following changes to rewards. We provide evidence for such differential sensitivity in two behavioral studies with humans. These results suggest that the SR is a computational substrate for semi-flexible choice in humans, introducing a subtler, more cognitive notion of habit.

neuroscience

Predictive representations can link model-based reinforcement learning to model-free mechanisms

Humans and animals are capable of evaluating actions by considering their long-run future rewards through a process described using model-based reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms. The mechanisms by which neural circuits perform the computations prescribed by model-based RL remain largely unknown; however, multiple lines of evidence suggest that neural circuits supporting model-based behavior are structurally homologous to and overlapping with those thought to carry out model-free temporal difference (TD) learning. Here, we lay out a family of approaches by which model-based computation may be built upon a core of TD learning. The foundation of this framework is the successor representation, a predictive state representation that, when combined with TD learning of value predictions, can produce a subset of the behaviors associated with model-based learning, while requiring less decision-time computation than dynamic programming. Using simulations, we delineate the precise behavioral capabilities enabled by evaluating actions using this approach, and compare them to those demonstrated by biological organisms. We then introduce two new algorithms that build upon the successor representation while progressively mitigating its limitations. Because this framework can account for the full range of observed putatively model-based behaviors while still utilizing a core TD framework, we suggest that it represents a neurally plausible family of mechanisms for model-based evaluation.\n\nAuthor SummaryAccording to standard models, when confronted with a choice, animals and humans rely on two separate, distinct processes to come to a decision. One process deliberatively evaluates the consequences of each candidate action and is thought to underlie the ability to flexibly come up with novel plans. The other process gradually increases the propensity to perform behaviors that were previously successful and is thought to underlie automatically executed, habitual reflexes. Although computational principles and animal behavior support this dichotomy, at the neural level, there is little evidence supporting a clean segregation. For instance, although dopamine -- famously implicated in drug addiction and Parkinsons disease -- currently only has a well-defined role in the automatic process, evidence suggests that it also plays a role in the deliberative process. In this work, we present a computational framework for resolving this mismatch. We show that the types of behaviors associated with either process could result from a common learning mechanism applied to different strategies for how populations of neurons could represent candidate actions. In addition to demonstrating that this account can produce the full range of flexible behavior observed in the empirical literature, we suggest experiments that could detect the various approaches within this framework.

neuroscience