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Meilinger, T.

Publications and source records attributed to Meilinger, T..

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Navigators learn a local graph, not a global map

It is still an unresolved issue how humans represent navigable space and use this information to relate distant locations, as when shortcuting or pointing. In the present study we compare two competing theoretical approaches to the structure of this spatial knowledge. We contrast the metric embedding of spatial information in a global reference frame (i.e., a Euclidean mental map) with models that assume only local place-to-place information (i.e., a labeled graph), which can be used to estimate shortcuts and pointing direction when needed. Two groups of participants learned a multi-corridor virtual maze by walking around a zig-zag loop that connected seven objects placed on a circle. One group experienced a possible Euclidean maze, and the other group an impossible, non-Euclidean, broken version of the maze. In the impossible environment, after walking one lap the participant was covertly teleported to the starting place again, despite having walked to a different Euclidean location. Thus, the local place-to-place metrics were globally inconsistent. During the test phase, participants pointed to targets in a clockwise or counterclockwise sequence around the circle from their current location. Whereas the possible maze group was fairly accurate, the estimates of the impossible maze group were systematically biased by the test sequence, as predicted by local place-to-place metrics. Despite being queried about the same target, participants pointed in significantly different directions, violating the metric postulates. The results suggest that human knowledge of navigable space is not a globally consistent Euclidean map, but can be characterized as a labeled graph.

animal behavior and cognition↗

Are allocentric spatial reference frames compatible with theories of Enactivism?

Theories of Enactivism propose an action-oriented approach to understand human cognition. So far, however, empirical evidence supporting these theories has been sparse. Here, we investigate whether spatial navigation based on allocentric reference frames that are independent of the observers physical body can be understood within an action-oriented approach. Therefore, we performed three experiments testing the knowledge of the absolute orientation of houses and streets towards north, the relative orientation of two houses and two streets, respectively, and the location of houses towards each other in a pointing task. Our results demonstrate that under time pressure, the relative orientation of two houses can be retrieved more accurately than the absolute orientation of single houses. With infinite time for cognitive reasoning, the performance of the task using house stimuli increased greatly for the absolute orientation and surpassed the slightly improved performance in the relative orientation task. In contrast, with streets as stimuli participants performed under time pressure better in the absolute orientation task. Overall, pointing from one house to another house yielded the best performance. This suggests, firstly, that orientation and location information about houses are primarily coded in house-to-house relations, whereas cardinal information is deduced via cognitive reasoning. Secondly, orientation information for streets is preferentially coded in absolute orientations. Thus, our results suggest that spatial information about house and street orientation is coded differently and that house orientation and location is primarily learned in an action-oriented way, which is in line with an enactive framework for human cognition.

neuroscience↗