Meijs, E. | Search bioRxiv

bioRxiv2018

Stimulus predictability does not modulate bottom-up attentional capture

Attention can be involuntarily captured by physically salient stimuli, a phenomenon known as bottom-up attention. Typically, these salient stimuli occur unpredictably in time and space. Therefore, in a series of three behavioral experiments, we investigated the extent to which such bottom-up attentional capture is a function of ones prior expectations. In the context of an exogenous cueing task, we systematically manipulated participants spatial (Experiment 1) or temporal (Experiment 2 and 3) expectations about an uninformative cue, and examined the extent of attentional capture by the cue. We anticipated larger attentional capture for unexpected compared to expected cues. However, while we observed robust attentional capture in all experiments, we did not find any evidence for a modulation of attentional capture by prior expectation. This underscores the automatic and reflexive nature of bottom-up attention.

neuroscience↗

bioRxiv2017

Dynamic interactions between top-down expectations and conscious awareness

It is well known that top-down expectations affect perceptual processes. Yet, remarkably little is known about the relationship between expectations and conscious awareness We address three crucial questions that are outstanding: 1) How do predictions affect the likelihood of conscious stimulus perception?; 2) Does the brain register violations of predictions nonconsciously?; and 3) Do predictions need to be conscious to influence perceptual decisions? We performed three experiments in which we manipulated stimulus predictability within the attentional blink paradigm, while combining visual psychophysics with electrophysiological recordings. We found that valid stimulus expectations increase the likelihood of conscious access of stimuli. Furthermore, our findings suggest a clear dissociation in the interaction between expectations and consciousness: conscious awareness seems crucial for the implementation of top-down predictions, but not for the bottom-up generation of stimulus-evoked prediction errors. These results constrain and update influential theories about the role of consciousness in the predictive brain.

neuroscience↗