Młynarski, W. F. | Search bioRxiv

bioRxiv2024

A theory of rapid behavioral inferences under the pressure of time

To survive, animals must be able quickly infer the state of their surroundings. For example, to successfully escape an approaching predator, prey must quickly estimate the direction of approach from incoming sensory stimuli and guide their behavior accordingly. Such rapid inferences are particularly challenging because the animal has only a brief window of time to gather sensory stimuli, and yet the accuracy of inference is critical for survival. Due to evolutionary pressures, nervous systems have likely evolved effective computational strategies that enable accurate inferences under strong time limitations. Traditionally, the relationship between the speed and accuracy of inference has been described by the "speed-accuracy tradeoff" (SAT), which quantifies how the average performance of an ideal observer improves as the observer has more time to collect incoming stimuli. While this trial-averaged description can reasonably account for individual inferences made over long timescales, it does not capture individual inferences on short timescales, when trial-to-trial variability gives rise to diverse patterns of error dynamics. We show that an ideal observer can exploit this single-trial structure by adaptively tracking the dynamics of its belief about the state of the environment, which enables it to speed its own inferences and more reliably track its own error, but also causes it to violate the SAT. We show that these features can be used to improve overall performance during rapid escape. The resulting behavior qualitatively reproduces features of escape behavior in the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster, whose escapes have presumably been highly optimized by natural selection.

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bioRxiv2022

Perceptual decisions exhibit hallmarks of dynamic Bayesian inference

To interpret the sensory environment, the brain combines ambiguous sensory measurements with context-specific prior experience. But environmental contexts can change abruptly and unpredictably, resulting in uncertainty about the current context. Here we address two questions: how should context-specific prior knowledge optimally guide the interpretation of sensory stimuli in changing environments, and do human decision-making strategies resemble this optimum? We probe these questions with a task in which subjects report the orientation of ambiguous visual stimuli that were drawn from three dynamically switching distributions, representing different environmental contexts. We derive predictions for an ideal Bayesian observer that leverages the statistical structure of the task to maximize decision accuracy and show that its decisions are biased by task context. The magnitude of this decision bias is not a fixed property of the sensory measurement but depends on the observers belief about the current context. The model therefore predicts that decision bias will grow with the reliability of the context cue, the stability of the environment, and with the number of trials since the last context switch. Analysis of human choice data validates all three predictions, providing evidence that the brain continuously updates probabilistic representations of the environment to best interpret an uncertain, ever-changing world. SIGNIFICANCEThe brain relies on prior knowledge to make perceptual inferences when sensory information is ambiguous. However, when the environmental context changes, the appropriate prior knowledge often changes with it. Here, we develop a Bayesian observer model to investigate how to make optimal perceptual inferences when sensory information and environmental context are both uncertain. The behavioral signature of this strategy is a context-appropriate decision bias whose strength grows with the reliability of the context cue, the stability of the environment, and with the number of decisions since the most recent change in context. We identified exactly this pattern in the behavior of human subjects performing a dynamic orientation discrimination task. Together, our results suggest that the brain continuously updates probabilistic representations of the environment to make perceptual decisions in the face of uncertainty over both sensory and contextual information.

neuroscience↗