Biology subjects

Filevich, E.

Publications and source records attributed to Filevich, E..

13 recordsLinked to original sources

bioRxiv2024

Dissociation of movement and outcome representations in metacognition of agency

We studied the role of movement and outcome information in forming metacognitive representations of agency. Participants completed a goal-oriented task, a virtual version of a ball-throwing game. In two conditions, we manipulated either the visual representation of the throwing movement or its distal outcome (the resulting ball flight/trajectory). We measured participants accuracy in a discrimination agency task, as well as confidence in their responses and tested for differences in the electrophysiological (EEG) signal using linear mixed effect models. We found no mean differences between participants metacognitive efficiency between conditions, but we also found that metacognitive sensitivity did not correlate between the two conditions, suggesting a dissociation in their underlying mechanisms. Furthermore, exploratory analyses pointed toward a difference in the EEG signal between the two conditions. Taken together, our results suggest that while movement and outcome information contribute equally to participants sense of agency, they may do so through distinct underlying processes.

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bioRxiv2024

Long-term perceptual priors drive confidence bias which favors prior-congruent evidence

According to the Bayesian framework, both our perceptual decisions and confidence about those decisions are based on the precision-weighted integration of prior expectations and incoming sensory information. While it is generally assumed that priors influence both decisions and confidence in the same way, previous work has found priors to have a stronger impact at the confidence level, challenging this assumption. However, these patterns were found for high-level probabilistic expectations that are flexibly induced in the task context. It remains unclear whether this generalizes to low-level perceptual priors that are naturally formed through long term exposure. Here we investigated human participants confidence in decisions made under the influence of a long-term perceptual prior: the slow-motion prior. Participants viewed tilted moving-line stimuli for which the slow-motion prior biases the perceived motion direction. On each trial, they made two consecutive motion direction decisions followed by a confidence decision. We contrasted two conditions - one in which the prior impacted discrimination performance, and one in which it did not. We found a confidence bias favoring the condition in which the prior influenced discrimination decisions, even after accounting for performance differences. Computational modeling revealed this effect to be best explained by confidence using the prior-congruent evidence as an additional cue, beyond the posterior evidence used in the perceptual decision. This is in agreement with a confirmatory confidence bias favoring evidence congruent with low-level perceptual priors, revealing that, in line with high-level expectations, even long-term priors have a greater influence on the metacognitive level than on perceptual decisions. Author SummaryPrior expectations play a critical role in shaping not only the perceptual inferences that we make, but also how confident we feel about those inferences. Bayesian confidence models capture that role, but assume priors to influence both decisions and confidence in the same way. Against this assumption, previous work has found dissociations in the influence of priors on decisions and confidence. However, that work has focussed only on high-level probabilistic priors, rather than the low-level perceptual priors that constrain our processing across many naturalistic situations. Here, we examine whether such dissociations arise under the influence of a low-level perceptual prior that naturally affects humans perception of motion, namely, the expectation that objects move slowly. We reveal evidence for such a dissociation: prior-congruent evidence impacts confidence to a greater extent than perceptual decisions. This suggests the existence of an implicit confidence bias favoring information that confirms prior beliefs, even in the case of long-term perceptual priors.

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bioRxiv2023

Contributions of tactile information to the sense of agency and its metacognitive representations

We compared the contribution of tactile information to other sources of information in our representations of agency. Participants (N = 40) reached with their right hand toward a ridged plate with a specific orientation and saw online feedback that could match or differ from their action in one of three ways: the physical plates orientation, the actions timing, or the hands position in space. Absolute subjective ratings revealed that an increased mismatch in tactile information led to a diminished sense of agency, similar to what has been reported for spatial and temporal mismatches. Further, estimations of metacognitive efficiency revealed similar M-ratios in the identification of tactile violation predictions as compared to temporal violations (but lower than spatial). These findings emphasize the importance of tactile information in shaping our experience of acting voluntarily, and show how this important component can be experimentally probed. Statement of RelevanceThe sense of agency is the feeling that we are the authors of our actions. It is essential not only for the control we assert over our bodies but also for how we interact with interfaces like a computer or a mobile phone. Despite the central role of touch in our daily activities, the role of tactile information in forming our sense of agency is often overlooked. In this project, we used a novel experimental design that allowed us to compare the role of tactile information relative to two other sources of information that have been previously reported to affect our agency, namely temporal and spatial information of the action. We provide evidence for the first time that tactile information is crucial for our subjective experience of agency and a tool to study this role further.

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bioRxiv2022

Prior information differentially affects discrimination decisions and subjective confidence reports

According to Bayesian models, both decisions and confidence are based on the same precision-weighted integration of prior expectations ("priors") and incoming information ("likelihoods"). This assumes that priors are integrated optimally and equally in decisions and confidence, which has not been tested. In two experiments, we quantitatively assessed how priors inform both decisions and confidence. With a gamified dual-decision task we controlled the strength of priors and likelihoods to create pairs of conditions that were matched in posterior information, but differed on whether the prior or likelihood was more informative. We found that priors were underweighted in discrimination decisions, but used to a greater extent in confidence about those decisions, and this was not due to differences in processing time. With a Bayesian model we quantified the weighting parameters for the prior at both levels, and confirmed that priors are more optimally used in explicit confidence, even when underused in decisions.

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bioRxiv2022

Metacognitive domains are not aligned along a dimension of internal-external information source

It is still debated whether metacognition, or the ability to monitor our own mental states, relies on mechanisms that are domain-general (a single mechanism can account for the monitoring of any mental process) or domain-specific (metacognition is accomplished by a collection of multiple monitoring modules, one for each cognitive domain). It has been speculated that two broad categories of metacognitive mechanisms may exist: those that monitor primarily externally-generated vs. those that monitor primarily internally-generated information. To test this proposed division, we measured metacognitive performance (using m-ratio, a signal detection theoretical measure) in four tasks that could be ranked along an internal-external axis of the source of information, namely memory, motor, visuomotor and visual tasks. We found correlations between m-ratios in visuomotor and motor tasks only; but no correlations between m-ratios in visual and visuomotor tasks, or between motor and memory tasks. While we found no correlation in metacognitive ability between visual and memory tasks, and a positive correlation between visuomotor and motor tasks, we found no evidence for a correlation between motor and memory tasks. This pattern of correlations does not support the grouping of domains based on whether the source of information is primarily internal or external. We suggest that other groupings could be more reflective of the nature of metacognition and discuss the need to consider other non-domain task-features when using correlations as a way to test the underlying shared mechanisms between domains.

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bioRxiv2022

Motor outcomes congruent with intentions may sharpen metacognitive representations

We can monitor our intentional movements, in order to describe how we move our bodies. But it is unclear which information this metacognitive monitoring relies on. For example, when throwing a ball to hit a target, we might use the visual information about how the ball flew to metacognitively assess our performance. Alternatively, we might disregard the ball trajectory -- given that it is not directly relevant to our goal -- and metacognitively assess our performance based solely on whether we reached the goal of hitting the target. In two experiments we aimed to distinguish between these two alternatives and asked whether the distal outcome of a goal-directed action (hitting or missing a target) informs the metacognitive representations of our own movements. Participants performed a semi-virtual task where they moved their arm to throw a virtual ball at a target. After each throw, participants discriminated which of two ball trajectories displayed on the screen corresponded to the flight path of their throw and then rated their confidence in this decision. The task included two conditions that differed on whether the distal outcome of the two trajectories shown matched (congruent) or differed (incongruent). Participants were significantly more accurate in discriminating between the two trajectories, and responded faster in the incongruent condition and, accordingly, were significantly more confident on these trials. Crucially, we found significant differences in metacognitive performance (measured as meta-d/d) between the two conditions only on successful trials, where the virtual ball had hit the target. These results indicate that participants successfully incorporated information about the outcome of the movement into both their discrimination and confidence responses. However, information about the outcome selectively sharpened the precision of confidence ratings only when the outcome of their throw matched their intention. We argue that these findings underline the separation between the different levels of information that may contribute to body monitoring, and we provide evidence that intentions might play a central role in metacognitive motor representations. HighlightsO_LIParticipants threw a virtual ball to hit a target C_LIO_LIFollowing their throw participants selected between two plausible trajectories C_LIO_LIOn half the trials, the two alternative trajectories differed in their distal outcome. C_LIO_LIDiscrimination and confidence were higher in trials with different outcome. C_LIO_LIMetacognitive performance was best in hit trials when the alternative missed. C_LI

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bioRxiv2021

Judgments of agency are affected by sensory noise without recruiting metacognitive processing

Judgments of agency, our sense of control over our actions and the environment, often occur in noisy conditions. We examined the computations underlying judgments of agency, in particular under the influence of sensory noise. Building on previous literature, we studied whether judgments of agency incorporate uncertainty in the same way that confidence judgments do, which would imply that the former share computational mechanisms with metacognitive judgments. In two tasks, participants rated agency, or confidence in a decision about their agency, over a virtual hand that tracked their movements, either synchronously or with a delay and either under high or low noise. We compared the predictions of two computational models to participants ratings and found that agency ratings, unlike confidence, were best explained by a model involving no estimates of sensory noise. We propose that agency judgments reflect first-order measures of the internal signal, without involving metacognitive computations, challenging the assumed link between the two cognitive processes.

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bioRxiv2021

Limited metacognitive access to one's own facial expressions

As humans we communicate important information through fine nuances in our facial expressions, but because conscious motor representations are noisy, we might not be able to report these fine but meaningful movements. Here we measured how much explicit metacognitive information young adults have about their own facial expressions. Participants imitated pictures of themselves making facial expressions and triggered a camera to take a picture of them while doing so. They then rated confidence (how well they thought they imitated each expression). We defined metacognitive access to facial expressions as the relationship between objective performance (how well the two pictures matched) and subjective confidence ratings. Metacognitive access to facial expressions was very poor when we considered all face features indiscriminately. Instead, machine learning analyses revealed that participants rated confidence based on idiosyncratic subsets of features. We conclude that metacognitive access to own facial expressions is partial, and surprisingly limited.

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bioRxiv2020

Measuring Metacognition of Direct and Indirect Parameters of Voluntary Movement

We can make exquisitely precise movements without the apparent need for conscious monitoring. But can we monitor the low-level movement parameters when prompted? And what are the mechanisms that allow us to monitor our movements? To answer these questions, we designed a semi-virtual ball throwing task. On each trial, participants first threw a virtual ball by moving their arm (with or without visual feedback, or replayed from a previous trial) and then made a two-alternative forced choice on the resulting ball trajectory. They then rated their confidence in their decision. We measured metacognitive efficiency using meta-d/d and compared it between different informational domains of the first-order task (motor, visuomotor or visual information alone), as well as between two different versions of the task based on different parameters of the movement: proximal (position of the arm) or distal (resulting trajectory of the ball thrown). We found that participants were able to monitor their performance based on distal motor information as well as when proximal information was available. Their metacognitive efficiency was also equally high in conditions with different sources of information available. The analysis of correlations across participants revealed an unexpected result: while metacognitive efficiency correlated between informational domains (which would indicate domain-generality of metacognition), it did not correlate across the different parameters of movement. We discuss possible sources of this discrepancy and argue that specific first-order task demands may play a crucial role in our metacognitive ability and should be considered when making inferences about domain-generality based on correlations.

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bioRxiv2019

Response-related signals increase confidence but not metacognitive performance

Confidence judgements are a central tool for research in metacognition. In a typical task, participants first perform perceptual (first-order) decisions and then rate their confidence in these decisions. The relationship between confidence and first-order accuracy is taken as measure of metacognitive performance. Confidence is often assumed to stem from decision-monitoring processes alone, but processes that co-occur with the first-order decision may also play a role in confidence formation. In fact, across a broad range of tasks, trials with quick reaction times to the first-order task are often judged with relatively higher confidence than those with slow responses. This robust finding suggests that confidence could be informed by a readout of reaction times in addition to decision-monitoring processes. To test this possibility, we assessed the contribution of response-related signals to confidence and, in particular, to metacognitive performance (i.e., a measure of the adequacy of these confidence judgements). In a factorial design, we measured the effect of making an overt (vs. covert) decision, as well as the effect of pairing a motor action to the stimulus about which the first-order decision is made. Against our expectations, we found no differences in overall confidence or metacognitive performance when first-order responses were covert as opposed to overt. Further, actions paired to visual stimuli presented led to higher confidence ratings, but did not affect metacognitive performance. These results suggest that some of the relationships between first-order decisional signals and confidence might indeed be correlational, and attributable to an upstream cognitive process, common to the two of them.

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bioRxiv2018

I know that I don’t know: Structural and functional connectivity underlying meta-ignorance in pre-schoolers

Research Highlights[1] Children develop the ability to report that they do not know something at around five years of age.\n\n[2] Children who could correctly report their own ignorance in a partial-knowledge task showed thicker cortices within medial orbitofrontal cortex.\n\n[3] This region was functionally connected to parts of the default-mode network.\n\n[4] The default-mode network might support the development of correct metacognitive monitoring.\n\nAbstractMetacognition plays a pivotal role in human development. The ability to realize that we do not know something, or meta-ignorance, emerges after approximately five years of age. We aimed at identifying the brain systems that underlie the developmental emergence of this ability in a preschool sample.\n\nTwenty-four children aged between five and six years answered questions under three conditions of a meta-ignorance task twice. In the critical partial knowledge condition, an experimenter first showed two toys to a child, then announced that she would place one of them in a box behind a screen, out of sight from the child. The experimenter then asked the child whether or not she knew which toy was in the box.\n\nChildren who answered correctly both times to the metacognitive question in the partial knowledge condition (n=9) showed greater cortical thickness in a cluster within left medial orbitofrontal cortex than children who did not (n=15). Further, seed-based functional connectivity analyses of the brain during resting state revealed that this region is functionally connected to the medial orbitofrontal gyrus, posterior cingulate gyrus and precuneus, and mid- and inferior temporal gyri.\n\nThis finding suggests that the default mode network, critically through its prefrontal regions, supports introspective processing. It leads to the emergence of metacognitive monitoring allowing children to explicitly report their own ignorance.

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bioRxiv2016

Behavioural, modeling, and electrophysiological evidence for domain-generality in human metacognition

Metacognition, or the capacity to introspect on ones own mental states, has been mostly characterized through confidence reports in visual tasks. A pressing question is to what extent the results from visual studies generalize to other domains. Answering this question allows determining whether metacognition operates through shared, domain-general mechanisms, or through idiosyncratic, domain-specific mechanisms. Here, we report three new lines of evidence for decisional and post-decisional mechanisms arguing for the domain-generality of metacognition. First, metacognitive efficiency correlated between auditory, tactile, visual, and audiovisual tasks. Second, confidence in an audiovisual task was best modeled using supramodal formats based on integrated representations of auditory and visual signals. Third, confidence in correct responses involved similar electrophysiological markers for visual and audiovisual tasks that are associated with motor preparation preceding the perceptual judgment. We conclude that the domain-generality of metacognition relies on supramodal confidence estimates and decisional signals that are shared across sensory modalities.

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bioRxiv2016

Resting-state fMRI correlations: from link-wiseunreliability to whole brain stability

The functional architecture of spontaneous BOLD fluctuations has been characterized in detail by numerous studies, demonstrating its potential relevance as a biomarker. However, the systematic investigation of its consistency is still in its infancy. Here, we analyze both the within- and between-subject variability as well as the test-retest reliability of resting-state functional connectivity (FC) estimates in a unique data set comprising multiple fMRI scans (42) from 5 subjects, and 50 single scans from 50 subjects. To this aim we adopted a statistical framework enabling us to disentangle the contribution of different sources of variability and their dependence on scan duration, and showed that the low reliability of single links can be largely improved using multiple scans per subject. Moreover, we show that practically all observed inter-region variability (at the link-level) is not significant and due to the statistical uncertainty of the estimator itself rather than to genuine variability among areas. Finally, we use the proposed statistical framework to demonstrate that, despite the poor consistency of single links, the information carried by the whole-brain spontaneous correlation structure is indeed robust, and can in fact be used as a functional fingerprint.

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