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Biology subjects

De Martino, B.

Publications and source records attributed to De Martino, B..

7 recordsLinked to original sources

Goals shape human confidence

Confidence guides our decisions: it determines when we commit to a choice, gather more information, or change our minds. Prominent models treat confidence as a readout of the evidence in support of a decision: given the same evidence, a similar confidence level should follow, regardless of what the decision-maker is trying to achieve. Here we show instead that confidence formation is relative to the goals of the decision-maker. Across value-based and perceptual decisions in different sensory modalities, we manipulated the behavioural goal, requiring participants to select the option with either the most or the least evidence. Reversing the goal reversed the relationship between evidence and confidence: biases previously considered fixed features of a confidence computation, such as the positive evidence bias (PEB), followed the goal rather than the stimulus. We developed a new computational model, GOAL (Goal-Oriented Asymmetric Likelihood), in which evidence is weighted according to its relevance for the current goal, and validated it in behavioural and physiological (pupillometry) experiments. Our findings support a new account of metacognition in which confidence is constructed relative to the goals of the decision-maker, prioritising goal-supportive evidence.

neuroscience↗

Blaming Luck, Claiming Skill: Self-Attribution Bias in Error Assignment

Mistakes are valuable learning opportunities, yet in uncertain environments, whether a lack of reward is due to poor performance or bad luck can be hard to tell. To investigate how humans address this issue, we developed a visuomotor task where rewards depended on either skill or chance. Participants consistently displayed a self-attribution bias, crediting successes to their own ability while blaming failures on randomness, an effect that influenced their subsequent decisions. Computational modelling revealed two underlying mechanisms--a distorted perception of ability and a positivity bias in the skill condition. Notably, while distorted self-perception shaped behaviour, it did not affect confidence; instead, self-attribution bias led to overconfidence in external blame. These findings suggest a more complex picture in which self-attribution biases arise from both perceptual distortions and post-decision evaluations, highlighting the need for an interplay between experimental design and computational modelling to understand behavioural biases.

animal behavior and cognition↗

Cherry-picking information: humans actively sample evidence to support prior beliefs

No one likes to be wrong. Previous research has shown that participants may underweight information incompatible with previous choices, a phenomenon called confirmation bias. In this paper we argue that a similar bias exists in the way information is actively sought. We investigate how choice influences information gathering using a perceptual choice task and find that participants sample more information from a previously chosen alternative. Furthermore, the higher the confidence in the initial choice, the more biased information sampling becomes. As a consequence, when faced with the possibility of revising an earlier decision, participants are more likely to stick with their original choice, even when incorrect. Critically, we show that agency controls this phenomenon. The effect disappears in a fixed sampling condition where presentation of evidence is controlled by the experimenter, suggesting that the way in which confirmatory evidence is acquired critically impacts the decision process. These results suggest active information acquisition plays a critical role in the propagation of strongly held beliefs over time.

neuroscience↗

Confirmation bias optimizes reward learning

Confirmation bias--the tendency to overweight information that matches prior beliefs or choices--has been shown to manifest even in simple reinforcement learning. In line with recent work, we find that participants learned significantly more from choice-confirming outcomes in a reward-learning task. What is less clear is whether asymmetric learning rates somehow benefit the learner. Here, we combine data from human participants and artificial agents to examine how confirmation-biased learning might improve performance by counteracting decisional and environmental noise. We evaluate one potential mechanism for such noise reduction: visual attention--a demonstrated driver of both value-based choice and predictive learning. Surprisingly, visual attention showed the opposite pattern to confirmation bias, as participants were most likely to fixate on "missed opportunities", slightly dampening the effects of the confirmation bias we observed. Several million simulated experiments with artificial agents showed this bias to be a reward-maximizing strategy compared to several alternatives, but only if disconfirming feedback is not completely ignored--a condition that visual attention may help to enforce.

animal behavior and cognition↗

Value Shapes Abstraction During Learning

The human brain excels at constructing and using abstractions, such as rules, or concepts. Here, in two fMRI experiments, we demonstrate a mechanism of abstraction built upon the valuation of sensory features. Human volunteers learned novel association rules linking simple visual features. Mixture-of-experts reinforcement learning algorithms revealed that, with learning, high-value abstract representations increasingly guided participants behaviour, resulting in better choices and higher subjective confidence. We also found that the brain area computing value signals - the ventromedial prefrontal cortex - prioritized and selected latent task elements during abstraction, both locally and through its connection to the visual cortex. Such coding scheme predicts a causal role for valuation: in a second experiment, we used multivoxel neural reinforcement to test for the causality of feature valuation in the sensory cortex as a mechanism of abstraction. Tagging the neural representation of a tasks feature with rewards evoked abstraction-based decisions. Together, these findings provide a new interpretation of value as a goal-dependent, key factor in forging abstract representations.

neuroscience↗

Visual attention modulates the integration of goal-relevant evidence and not value

When choosing between options, such as food items presented in plain view, people tend to choose the option they spend longer looking at. The prevailing interpretation is that visual attention increases value. However, in previous studies, value was coupled to a behavioural goal, since subjects had to choose the item they preferred. This makes it impossible to discern if visual attention has an effect on value, or, instead, if attention modulates the information most relevant for the goal of the decision-maker. Here we present the results of two independent studies--a perceptual and a value-based task--that allow us to decouple value from goal-relevant information using specific task-framing. Combining psychophysics with computational modelling, we show that, contrary to the current interpretation, attention does not boost value, but instead it modulates goal-relevant information. This work provides a novel and more general mechanism by which attention interacts with choice.

neuroscience↗

Confidence modulates exploration and exploitation in value-based learning

Uncertainty is ubiquitous in cognitive processing, which is why agents require a precise handle on how to deal with the noise inherent in their mental operations. Previous research suggests that people possess a remarkable ability to track and report uncertainty, often in the form of confidence judgments. Here, we argue that humans use uncertainty inherent in their representations of value beliefs to arbitrate between exploration and exploitation. Such uncertainty is reflected in explicit confidence judgments. Using a novel variant of a multi-armed bandit paradigm, we studied how beliefs were formed and how uncertainty in the encoding of these value beliefs (belief confidence) evolved over time. We found that people used uncertainty to arbitrate between exploration and exploitation, reflected in a higher tendency towards exploration when their confidence in their value representations was low. We furthermore found that value uncertainty can be linked to frameworks of metacognition in decision making in two ways. First, belief confidence drives decision confidence--that is peoples evaluation of their own choices. Second, individuals with higher metacognitive insight into their choices were also better at tracing the uncertainty in their environment. Together, these findings argue that such uncertainty representations play a key role in the context of cognitive control.

neuroscience↗