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Clithero, J. A.

Publications and source records attributed to Clithero, J. A..

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Accounting for taste: A multi-attribute neurocomputational model explains the neural dynamics of choices for self and others

How do we make choices for others with different preferences from our own? Although neuroimaging studies implicate similar circuits in representing preferences for oneself and others, some models propose that additional corrective mechanisms come online when choices for others diverge from ones own preferences. Here we used event-related potentials (ERP) in humans, in combination with computational modeling, to examine how social information is integrated in the time leading up to choices for oneself and others. Hungry male and female participants with unrestricted diets selected foods for themselves, a similar unrestricted eater, and a dissimilar, self-identified healthy eater. Across choices for both oneself and others, ERP value signals emerged within the same time window but differentially reflected taste and health attributes based on the recipients preferences. Choices for the dissimilar recipient were associated with earlier activity localized to brain regions implicated in social cognition including temporoparietal junction (TPJ). Finally, response-locked analysis revealed a late ERP component specific to choices for the similar recipient, localized to the parietal lobe, that appeared to reflect differences in the response threshold based on uncertainty. A multi-attribute computational model supported the link between specific ERP components and distinct model parameters, and was not significantly improved by adding time-dependent dual processes. Model simulations suggested that longer response times (RTs) previously associated with effortful correction may alternatively arise from higher choice uncertainty. Together these results provide a parsimonious neurocomputational mechanism for social decision-making, additionally explaining divergent patterns of choice and RT data in decisions for oneself and others.\n\nSignificance StatementHow do we choose for others, particularly when they have different preferences? Whereas some studies suggest that similar neural circuits underlie decision-making for oneself and others, others argue for additional, slower perspective-taking mechanisms. Combining event-related potentials with computational modeling, we found that integration of others preferences occurs over the same timescale as for oneself, while differentially tracking recipient-relevant attributes. Although choosing for others took longer and produced differences in late-emerging neural responses, computational modeling attributed these patterns to greater response caution rather than egocentric bias correction. Computational simulations also correctly predicted when and why choosing differently for others takes longer, suggesting that a model incorporating value integration and evidence accumulation can parsimoniously account for complex patterns in social decision-making.

neuroscience

Reason’s Enemy Is Not Emotion: Engagement of Cognitive Control Networks Explains Biases in Gain/Loss Framing

In the classic gain/loss framing effect, describing a gamble as a potential gain or loss biases people to make risk-averse or risk-seeking decisions, respectively. The canonical explanation for this effect is that frames differentially modulate emotional processes - which in turn leads to irrational choice behavior. Here, we evaluate the source of framing biases by integrating functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data from 143 human participants performing a gain/loss framing task with meta-analytic data from over 8000 neuroimaging studies. We found that activation during choices consistent with the framing effect were most correlated with activation associated with the resting or default brain, while activation during choices inconsistent with the framing effect most correlated with the task-engaged brain. Our findings argue against the common interpretation of gain/loss framing as a competition between emotion and control. Instead, our study indicates that this effect results from differential cognitive engagement across decision frames.\n\nSignificance StatementThe biases frequently exhibited by human decision-makers have often been attributed to the presence of emotion. Using a large fMRI sample and analysis of whole-brain networks defined with the meta-analytic tool Neurosynth, we find that neural activity during frame-biased decisions are more significantly associated with default behaviors (and the absence of executive control) than with emotion. These findings point to a role for neuroscience in shaping longstanding psychological theories in decision science.

neuroscience