Ciston, A. B. | Search bioRxiv

bioRxiv2023

Contributions of tactile information to the sense of agency and its metacognitive representations

We compared the contribution of tactile information to other sources of information in our representations of agency. Participants (N = 40) reached with their right hand toward a ridged plate with a specific orientation and saw online feedback that could match or differ from their action in one of three ways: the physical plates orientation, the actions timing, or the hands position in space. Absolute subjective ratings revealed that an increased mismatch in tactile information led to a diminished sense of agency, similar to what has been reported for spatial and temporal mismatches. Further, estimations of metacognitive efficiency revealed similar M-ratios in the identification of tactile violation predictions as compared to temporal violations (but lower than spatial). These findings emphasize the importance of tactile information in shaping our experience of acting voluntarily, and show how this important component can be experimentally probed. Statement of RelevanceThe sense of agency is the feeling that we are the authors of our actions. It is essential not only for the control we assert over our bodies but also for how we interact with interfaces like a computer or a mobile phone. Despite the central role of touch in our daily activities, the role of tactile information in forming our sense of agency is often overlooked. In this project, we used a novel experimental design that allowed us to compare the role of tactile information relative to two other sources of information that have been previously reported to affect our agency, namely temporal and spatial information of the action. We provide evidence for the first time that tactile information is crucial for our subjective experience of agency and a tool to study this role further.

neuroscience↗

bioRxiv2021

Limited metacognitive access to one's own facial expressions

As humans we communicate important information through fine nuances in our facial expressions, but because conscious motor representations are noisy, we might not be able to report these fine but meaningful movements. Here we measured how much explicit metacognitive information young adults have about their own facial expressions. Participants imitated pictures of themselves making facial expressions and triggered a camera to take a picture of them while doing so. They then rated confidence (how well they thought they imitated each expression). We defined metacognitive access to facial expressions as the relationship between objective performance (how well the two pictures matched) and subjective confidence ratings. Metacognitive access to facial expressions was very poor when we considered all face features indiscriminately. Instead, machine learning analyses revealed that participants rated confidence based on idiosyncratic subsets of features. We conclude that metacognitive access to own facial expressions is partial, and surprisingly limited.

neuroscience↗