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Chambers, C.

Publications and source records attributed to Chambers, C..

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The Development Of Bayesian Integration In Sensorimotor Estimation

If the brain is inherently Bayesian, then behavior should show the signatures of Bayesian computation from an early stage in life without the need for learning. Children should integrate probabilistic information from prior and likelihood distributions to reach decisions and should be as statistically efficient as adults. To test this idea, we examined the integration of prior and likelihood information in a simple position estimation task comparing children aged 6-11 years and adults. During development, estimation performance became closer to the statistical optimum. Children use likelihood information as well as adults but are limited in their use of priors. This finding suggests that Bayesian behavior is not inherent but learnt over the course of development.

neuroscience

Policies or Knowledge: Priors differ between perceptual and sensorimotor tasks

If the brain abstractly represents probability distributions as knowledge, then the modality of a decision, e.g. movement vs perception, should not matter. If on the other hand, learned representations are policies, they may be specific to the task where learning takes place. Here, we test this by asking if a learned spatial prior generalizes from a sensorimotor estimation task to a two-alternative-forced choice (2-Afc) perceptual comparison task. A model and simulation-based analysis revealed that while participants learn the experimentally-imposed prior distribution in the sensorimotor estimation task, measured priors are consistently broader than expected in the 2-Afc task. That the prior does not fully generalize suggests that sensorimotor priors strongly resemble policies. In disagreement with standard Bayesian thought, the modality of the decision has a strong influence on the implied prior distribution.\n\nNEW AND NOTEWORTHYWe do not know if the brain represents abstract and generalizable knowledge or task-specific policies that map internal states to actions. We find that learning in a sensorimotor task does not generalize strongly to a perceptual task, suggesting that humans learned policies and did not truly acquire knowledge. Priors differ across tasks, thus casting doubt on the central tenet of may Bayesian models, that the brains representation of the world is built on generalizable knowledge.

neuroscience