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Benrimoh, D.

Publications and source records attributed to Benrimoh, D..

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A Bayesian account of generalist and specialist formation under the Active Inference framework

This paper offers a formal account of policy learning, or habitual behavioural optimisation, under the framework of Active Inference. In this setting, habit formation becomes an autodidactic, experience-dependent process, based upon what the agent sees itself doing. We focus on the effect of environmental volatility on habit formation by simulating artificial agents operating in a partially observable Markov decision process. Specifically, we used a two-step maze paradigm, in which the agent has to decide whether to go left or right to secure a reward. We observe that in volatile environments with numerous reward locations, the agents learn to adopt a generalist strategy, never forming a strong habitual behaviour for any preferred maze direction. Conversely, in conservative or static environments, agents adopt a specialist strategy; forming strong preferences for policies that result in approach to a small number of previously-observed reward locations. The pros and cons of the two strategies are tested and discussed. In general, specialization offers greater benefits, but only when contingencies are conserved over time. We consider the implications of this formal (Active Inference) account of policy learning for understanding the relationship between specialisation and habit formation.\n\nAuthor SummaryActive inference is a theoretical framework that formalizes the behaviour of any organism in terms of a single imperative - to minimize surprise. Starting from this principle, we can construct simulations of simple \"agents\" (artificial organisms) that show the ability to infer causal relationships and learn. Here, we expand upon currently-existing implementations of Active Inference by enabling synthetic agents to optimise the space of behavioural policies that they can pursue. Our results show that by adapting the probabilities of certain action sequences (which may correspond biologically to the phenomenon of synaptic plasticity), and by rejecting improbable sequences (synaptic pruning), the agents can begin to form habits. Furthermore, we have shown our agents habit formation to be environment-dependent. Some agents become specialised to a constant environment, while other adopt a more general strategy, each with sensible pros and cons. This work has potential applications in computational psychiatry, including in behavioural phenotyping to better understand disorders.

neuroscience

Hallucinations both in and out of context: An Active Inference Account

Hallucinations, including auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH), occur in both the healthy population and in psychotic conditions such as schizophrenia (often developing after a prodromal period). In addition, hallucinations can be in-context (they can be consistent with the environment, such as when one hallucinates the end of a sentence that has been repeated many times), or out-of-context (such as the bizarre hallucinations associated with schizophrenia). In previous work, we introduced a model of hallucinations as false (positive) inferences based on a (Markov decision process) formulation of active inference. In this work, we extend this model to include content - to disclose the computational mechanisms behind in- and out-of-context hallucinations. In active inference, sensory information is used to disambiguate alternative hypotheses about the causes of sensations. Sensory information is balanced against prior beliefs, and when this balance is tipped in the favor of prior beliefs, hallucinations can occur. We show that in-context hallucinations arise when (simulated) subjects cannot use sensory information to correct prior beliefs about hearing a voice, but beliefs about content (i.e. the sequential order of a sentence) remain accurate. When hallucinating subjects also have inaccurate beliefs about state transitions, out-of-context hallucinations occur; i.e. their hallucinated speech content is disordered. Furthermore, subjects with inaccurate beliefs about state transitions but an intact ability to use sensory information do not hallucinate and are reminiscent of prodromal patients. This work demonstrates the different computational mechanisms that may underlie the spectrum of hallucinatory experience - from the healthy population to psychotic states.

neuroscience