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Algermissen, J.

Publications and source records attributed to Algermissen, J..

9 recordsLinked to original sources

Low-intensity focused ultrasound to human amygdala reveals a causal role in ambiguous emotion processing and alters local and network-level activity

The amygdala is a core region changed in depression, a disorder characterized by compromised emotion, motivation and learning processes. However, lesion studies in humans examining amygdala function have largely focused on its role in processing fear. It currently remains unclear what causal role the human amygdala plays in more complex emotion, motivation and learning processes in daily life. This is because it has not been possible to reversibly modulate amygdala activity non-invasively in humans. Here, we used transcranial focused ultrasound stimulation (TUS) to bilaterally perturb neural activity in the basolateral amygdala (BLA). In separate sessions (n = 87), 29 healthy volunteers received offline-TUS to bilateral BLA, mid-insula or sham before playing a novel emotional learning task validated in an independent large cohort online (n = 210). 7T-resting-state and metabolite signals clearly demonstrated target engagement. BLA-TUS reduced the BLAs connectivity fingerprint and decreased its excitation/inhibition balance, suggesting an inhibitory effect of our TUS protocol on BLA activity. In behaviour, BLA-TUS caused a stimulation volume-dependent increase in the tendency to approach neutral, emotionally ambiguous faces, treating them more similarly to happy faces, and a slowing of reaction times for those two emotion categories. These effects were functionally and regionally specific and suggest a causal role for the amygdala in resolving emotional ambiguity. Our results provide important insights for future studies into mood disorders where ambiguous situations might be harder to resolve, which could contribute to existing emotional and learning biases.

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Ultrasound neuromodulation reveals distinct roles of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and anterior insula in Pavlovian biases

Pavlovian biases reflect the notorious influence of hard-wired, evolutionarily conserved cue-response tendencies on instrumental action selection: people show automatic action invigoration in face of potential rewards, but action suppression in face of potential punishments. The neural origin of these biases is unclear. Past evidence suggests dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and anterior insula (aIns) as part of a "reset network" that rapidly responds to salient information and might contribute to these biases. We used transcranial ultrasonic stimulation (TUS) in 29 healthy participants to interfere with neural activity in these regions and test their causal role in a within-subject, counter-balanced design across three sessions (sham, TUS-dACC, TUS-aIns). Computational modelling revealed a double dissociation, with distinct roles of both regions in Pavlovian biases: while TUS to the aIns decreased peoples tendency to overly take credit for rewards following action and to ignore punishments following inaction, TUS to dACC increased participants tendency to take the cue valence as a reinforcer signal. Although the dACC and aIns are part of the same network and often co-activate during decision-making tasks, TUS interference reveals their distinct roles: the dACC mediates cue-dependence persistence while the aIns is critical for inferring whether outcomes are self-caused.

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Pupil dilation reflects effortful action invigoration in overcoming aversive Pavlovian biases

"Pavlovian" or "motivational" biases describe the phenomenon that the valence of prospective outcomes modulates action invigoration: Reward prospect invigorates action, while punishment prospect suppresses it. The adaptive role of these biases in decision-making is still unclear. One idea is that they constitute a fast-and-frugal decision strategy in situations characterized by high arousal, e.g., in presence of a predator, which demand a quick response. In this pre-registered study (N = 35), we tested whether such a situation--induced via subliminally presented angry vs. neutral faces--leads to increased reliance on Pavlovian biases. We measured trial-by-trial arousal by tracking pupil diameter while participants performed an orthogonalized Motivational Go/NoGo Task. Pavlovian biases were present in responses, reaction times, and even gaze, with lower gaze dispersion under aversive cues reflecting "freezing of gaze". The subliminally presented faces did not affect responses, reaction times, or pupil diameter, suggesting that the arousal manipulation was ineffective. However, pupil dilations reflected facets of bias suppression, specifically the physical (but not cognitive) effort needed to overcome aversive inhibition: Particularly strong and sustained dilations occurred when participants managed to perform Go responses to aversive cues. Conversely, no such dilations occurred when they managed to inhibit responses to Win cues. These results suggest that pupil diameter does not reflect response conflict per se nor the inhibition of prepotent responses, but specifically effortful action invigoration as needed to overcome aversive inhibition. We discuss our results in the context of the "value of work" theory of striatal dopamine.

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High stakes slow responding, but do not help overcome Pavlovian biases in humans

"Pavlovian" or "motivational" biases are the phenomenon that the valence of prospective outcomes modulates action invigoration: the prospect of reward invigorates actions, while the prospect of punishment suppresses actions. Effects of the valence of prospective outcomes are well established, but it remains unclear how the magnitude of outcomes ("stake magnitude") modulates these biases. In this pre-registered study (N = 55), we manipulated stake magnitude (high vs. low) in an orthogonalized Motivational Go/NoGo Task. We tested whether higher stakes (a) strengthen biases or (b) elicit cognitive control recruitment, enhancing the suppression of biases in motivationally incongruent conditions. Confirmatory tests showed that high stakes slowed down responding, especially in motivationally incongruent conditions. However, high stakes did not affect whether a response was made or not, and did not change the magnitude of Pavlovian biases. Reinforcement-learning drift- diffusion models (RL-DDMs) fit to the data suggested that response slowing was best captured by stakes prolonging the non-decision time. There was no effect of the stakes on the response threshold (as in typical speed-accuracy tradeoffs). In sum, these results suggest that high stakes slow down responses without affecting the expression of Pavlovian biases in behavior. We speculate that this slowing under high stakes might reflect heightened cognitive control, which is however ineffectively used, or reflect positive conditioned suppression, i.e., the interference between goal-directed and consummatory behaviors, a phenomenon previously observed in rodents that might also exist in humans. Pavlovian biases and slowing under high stakes may arise in parallel to each other.

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Goal-directed recruitment of Pavlovian biases through selective visual attention

Prospective outcomes bias behavior in a "Pavlovian" manner: Reward prospect invigorates action, while punishment prospect suppresses it. Theories have posited Pavlovian biases as global action "priors" in unfamiliar or uncontrollable environments. However, this account fails to explain the strength of these biases--causing frequent action slips--even in well-known environments. We propose that Pavlovian control is additionally useful if flexibly recruited by instrumental control. Specifically, instrumental action plans might shape selective attention to reward/ punishment information and thus the input to Pavlovian control. In two eye-tracking samples (N = 35/ 64), we observed that Go/ NoGo action plans influenced when and for how long participants attended to reward/ punishment information, which in turn biased their responses in a Pavlovian manner. Participants with stronger attentional effects showed higher performance. Thus, humans appear to align Pavlovian control with their instrumental action plans, extending its role beyond action defaults to a powerful tool ensuring robust action execution.

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Biased credit assignment in motivational learning biases arises through prefrontal influences on striatal learning

Actions are biased by the outcomes they can produce: Humans are more likely to show action under reward prospect, but hold back under punishment prospect. Such motivational biases derive not only from biased response selection, but also from biased learning: humans tend to attribute rewards to their own actions, but are reluctant to attribute punishments to having held back. The neural origin of these biases is unclear; in particular, it remains open whether motivational biases arise primarily from the architecture of subcortical regions or also reflect cortical influences, the latter being typically associated with increased behavioral flexibility and emancipation from stereotyped behaviors. Simultaneous EEG-fMRI allowed us to track which regions encoded biased prediction errors in which order. Biased prediction errors occurred in cortical regions (dACC, PCC) before subcortical regions (striatum). These results highlight that biased learning is not a mere feature of the basal ganglia, but arises through prefrontal cortical contributions, revealing motivational biases to be a potentially flexible, sophisticated mechanism.

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Cortical dopamine reduces the impact of motivational biases governing automated behaviour

Motivations shape our behaviour: the promise of reward invigorates, while in the face of punishment, we hold back. Abnormalities of motivational processing are implicated in clinical disorders characterised by excessive habits and loss of top-down control, notably substance and behavioural addictions. Striatal and frontal dopamine have been hypothesised to play complementary roles in the respective generation and control of these motivational biases. However, while dopaminergic interventions have indeed been found to modulate motivational biases, these previous pharmacological studies used regionally non-selective pharmacological agents. Here, we tested the hypothesis that frontal dopamine controls the balance between Pavlovian, bias-driven automated responding and instrumentally learned action values. Specifically, we examined whether selective enhancement of cortical dopamine either (i) enables adaptive suppression of Pavlovian control when biases are maladaptive; or (ii) non-specifically modulates the degree of bias-driven automated responding. Healthy individuals (n=35) received the catechol-o-methyltransferase (COMT) inhibitor tolcapone in a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled cross-over design, and completed a motivational Go NoGo task known to elicit motivational biases. In support of hypothesis (ii), tolcapone globally decreased motivational bias. Specifically, tolcapone improved performance on trials where the bias was unhelpful, but impaired performance in bias-congruent conditions. These results indicate a non-selective role for cortical dopamine in the regulation of motivational processes underpinning top-down control over automated behaviour. The findings have direct relevance to understanding neurobiological mechanisms underpinning addiction and obsessive-compulsive disorders, as well as highlighting a potential trans-diagnostic novel mechanism to address such symptoms.

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Striatal BOLD and midfrontal theta power express motivation for action

Action selection is biased by the valence of anticipated outcomes. To assess mechanisms by which these motivational biases are expressed and controlled, we measured simultaneous EEG-fMRI during a motivational Go/NoGo learning task (N=36), leveraging the temporal resolution of EEG and subcortical access of fMRI. VmPFC BOLD encoded cue valence, importantly predicting trial-by-trial valence-driven response speed differences and EEG theta power around cue onset. In contrast, striatal BOLD encoded selection of active Go responses and correlated with theta power around response time. Within trials, theta power ramped in the fashion of an evidence accumulation signal for the value of making a Go response, capturing the faster responding to reward cues. Our findings reveal a dual nature of midfrontal theta power, with early components reflecting the vmPFC contribution to motivational biases, and late components reflecting their striatal translation into behavior, in line with influential recent "value of work" theories of striatal processing.

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Explore or reset? Pupil diameter transiently increases in self-chosen switches between cognitive labor and leisure in either direction

When people invest effort in cognitive work, they often keep an eye open for rewarding alternative activities. Previous research suggests that the norepinephrine (NE) system regulates such trade-offs between exploitation of the current task and exploration of alternative possibilities. Here we examine the possibility that the NE-system is involved in a related trade-off, i.e., the trade-off between cognitive labor and leisure. We conducted two pre-registered studies (total N = 62) in which participants freely chose to perform either a paid 2-back task (labor) vs. a non-paid task (leisure), while we tracked their pupil diameter--which is an indicator of the state of the NE system. In both studies, consistent with prior work, we found (a) increases in pupil baseline and (b) decreases in pupil dilation when participants switched from labor to leisure. Unexpectedly, we found the same pattern when participants switched from leisure back to labor. Both increases in pupil baseline and decreases in pupil dilation were short-lived. Collectively, these results are more consistent with a role of norepinephrine in reorienting attention and task switching, as suggested by network reset theory, than with a role in motivation, as suggested by adaptive gain theory.

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