Biology subjects

Addante, R. J.

Publications and source records attributed to Addante, R. J..

4 recordsLinked to original sources

bioRxiv2024

A third kind of episodic memory: Context familiarity is a distinct process from item familiarity and recollection

Episodic memory is accounted for with two processes: familiarity when generally recognizing an item and recollection when retrieving the full contextual details bound with the item. Paradoxically, people sometimes report contextual information as familiar but without recollecting details, which is not easily accounted for by existing theories. We tested a combination of item recognition confidence and source memory, focusing upon item-only hits with source unknown ( item familiarity), low-confidence hits with correct source memory ( context familiarity), and high-confidence hits with correct source memory ( recollection). Results across multiple within-subjects (trial-wise) and between subjects (individual variability) levels indicated these were behaviorally and physiologically distinct. Behaviorally, a crossover interaction was evident in response times, with context familiarity being slower than each condition during item recognition, but faster during source memory. Electrophysiologically, a Condition x Time x Location triple dissociation was evident in event-related potentials (ERPs), which was then independently replicated. Context familiarity exhibited an independent negative central effect from 800-1200 ms, differentiated from positive ERPs for item-familiarity (400 to 600 ms) and recollection (600 to 900 ms). These three conditions thus reflect mutually exclusive, fundamentally different processes of episodic memory. Context familiarity is a third distinct process of episodic memory. SummaryMemory for past events is widely believed to operate through two different processes: one called recollection when retrieving confident, specific details of a memory, and another called familiarity when only having an unsure but conscious awareness that an item was experienced before. When people successfully retrieve details such as the source or context of a prior event, it has been assumed to reflect recollection. We demonstrate that familiarity of context is functionally distinct from familiarity of items and recollection and offer a new, tri-component model of memory. The three memory responses were differentiated across multiple behavioral and brain wave measures. What has traditionally been thought to be two kinds of memory processes are actually three, becoming evident when using sensitive enough multi-measures. Results are independently replicated across studies from different labs. These data reveal that context familiarity is a third process of human episodic memory. Graphical Abstract O_FIG O_LINKSMALLFIG WIDTH=200 HEIGHT=99 SRC="FIGDIR/small/603640v5_ufig1.gif" ALT="Figure 1"> View larger version (38K): org.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@224a21org.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@130eccforg.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@10b1901org.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@196cdb5_HPS_FORMAT_FIGEXP M_FIG C_FIG

neuroscience↗

bioRxiv2020

Recollection is more than retrieving context or source memory: evidence from ERPs of Recognition and Source Memory combinations

The goal of this study was to investigate a relatively unstudied memory condition for paradoxical combinations of item + source memory confidence responses, which challenged the conventional views of the memory processes supporting item and source memory judgments. We studied instances in which people provided accurate source memory judgments (conventionally ascribed as representing recollection) after having first produced low- confidence item recognition hits for the same items (conventionally thought to reflect familiarity-based processing). This paradoxical combination does not fit traditional accounts of being recollection (because it had low-confidence recognition) nor accounts of familiarity (since it had accurate source memory), and event-related potentials (ERPs) were used to adjudicate which processes support these kinds of memories. ERP results were unlike the conventional ERP effects of memory, lacking both an FN400 and the parietal old-new effect (LPC), and instead exhibited a significant negative-going ERP effect occurring later in time (800-1200ms) in central-parietal sites. Behavioral measures of response times revealed a crossover interaction: low confident recognition hits were slower during recognition but faster during source memory when compared to the opposite pattern seen for instances of high confident hits. Results provide a comprehensive characterization of the individual variability of the FN400 and LPC effects of memory, while adding the behavioral and physiological characterization of a late negative-going ERP effect for accurate source memory without recollection. Conclusions indicated that episodic context could be retrieved independently from recollection, while suggesting a role for a process of context familiarity that is independent from item-familiarity. HighlightsO_LIRecollection is often defined as remembering the source or context of information C_LIO_LIPrior work used ERPs to identify times when source memory did not have recollection C_LIO_LICurrent work replicated ERPs with added response times and measures of variance C_LIO_LIRecollection was not evident in certain source memories, which had a negative ERP C_LIO_LIRecollection is independent of context and is more than just remembering sources C_LI Graphical Abstract O_FIG O_LINKSMALLFIG WIDTH=200 HEIGHT=182 SRC="FIGDIR/small/339697v1_ufig1.gif" ALT="Figure 1"> View larger version (69K): org.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@4926f8org.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@9d87d4org.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@40a701org.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@9460f1_HPS_FORMAT_FIGEXP M_FIG C_FIG

neuroscience↗

bioRxiv2020

Recallable but not Recognizable: The Influence of Semantic Priming in Recall Paradigms

When people can successfully recall a studied word, they should be able to recognize it as having been studied. In cued recall paradigms, however, participants sometimes correctly recall words in the presence of strong semantic cues but then fail to recognize those words as actually having been studied. Although the conditions necessary to produce this unusual effect are known, the underlying neural correlates have not been investigated. Across two experiments, involving both behavioral and electrophysiological methods (EEG), we investigated the cognitive and neural processes that underlie recognition failures. Experiments 1A and 1B showed that, in cued recall paradigms, presuming that recalled items can be recognized is a flawed assumption: Recognition failures occur in the presence of cues, regardless of whether those failures are measured. Experiment 2 showed that successfully recalled words that are recognized are driven by recollection at recall and by a combination of recollection and familiarity at recognition; in contrast, recognition failures are driven by semantic priming at recall and followed by negative-going ERP effects consistent with implicit processes such as repetition fluency and context familiarity at recognition. These results demonstrate that recall--long-characterized as predominantly reflecting recollection-based processing in episodic memory--can at times also be served by a confluence of implicit cognitive processes.

neuroscience↗

bioRxiv2019

Neurophysiological Correlates of the Dunning-Kruger Effect Reveal Contributions of Episodic Memory to Metacognitive Judgments of Illusory Superiority

Abstract.The Dunning-Kruger Effect (DKE) is a metacognitive phenomenon of illusory superiority in which individuals who perform poorly on a task believe they performed better than others, yet individuals who performed very well believe they under-performed compared to others. This phenomenon has yet to be directly explored in episodic memory, nor explored for reaction times or physiological correlates. We designed a novel method to elicit the DKE via a test of item recognition while electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded. Throughout the task, participants were asked to estimate the percentile in which they performed compared to others. Results revealed participants in the bottom 25th percentile overestimated their percentile, while participants in the top 75th percentile underestimated their percentile, exhibiting the classic DKE. Reaction time measures revealed a condition x group interaction whereby over-estimators responded faster than under-estimators when estimating being in the top percentile and responded slower when estimating being in the bottom percentile. Between-group EEG differences were evident between over-estimators and under-estimators during Dunning-Kruger responses, which revealed FN400-like effects of familiarity supporting differences for over-estimators from 400-600 ms, whereas old-new memory ERP effects revealed a late parietal component (LPC) associated with recollection-based processing from 600-900 ms for under-estimators that was not evident for over-estimators. Findings suggest over- and under-estimators use differing cognitive processes when assessing their performance, such that under-estimators rely on recollection during memory and over-estimators draw upon excess familiarity when over-estimating their performance. Episodic memory thus appears to play a contributory role in metacognitive judgments of illusory superiority and inferiority. Graphical AbstractEvent-related potentials (ERPS) were recorded for the Dunning-Kruger Effect as subjects made metacognitive judgments about performance on a memory task. Over- and Under-estimators exhibited a crossover interaction in response times when believing they did best and worst, respectively. A crossover pattern was also observed for ERPs: LPC signals of recollection were found for under-estimators, whereas familiarity-based FN400 effects were evident for over-estimators and correlated with estimates. O_FIG O_LINKSMALLFIG WIDTH=200 HEIGHT=184 SRC="FIGDIR/small/888511v2_ufig1.gif" ALT="Figure 1"> View larger version (49K): org.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@12d42b2org.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@75ef31org.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@aa8a9dorg.highwire.dtl.DTLVardef@725925_HPS_FORMAT_FIGEXP M_FIG C_FIG

neuroscience↗